154. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions1

860. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. British Minister acting on Foreign Office instructions made official démarche June 82 on decision UNC as result June 7 MAC meeting proceed on basis May 31 announcement (CINCUNC message FE 202012)3 and U.S. refusal thereafter delay notification to NNSC. June 74 and 8 British requested we instruct UNC defer notification to NNSC to withdraw in attempt obtain voluntary withdrawal based on MAC authorization, and asked [Page 279] for meeting Sixteen to consider situation. Both requests were declined.

British position contains following main points:

1.
In May 28 reply Communist April 9 note, 16 including U.S. supported proposal NNSC withdrawal to DZ while retaining right despatch teams to designated ports when need arose.
2.
During June 4 and 7 MAC meetings Communist side accepted withdrawal on this basis.
3.
In rejecting this offer UNC took position inconsistent 16’s May 28 note and thereby precluding voluntary withdrawal by agreement all parties.
4.
HMG if questioned would be forced say that although had approved UNC action in principle had not been fully consulted by U.S. re manner implementation.

In oral reply Department maintained:

1.
UNC action from start based on Communist violations Armistice and our legal right take action protect our interests. Therefore impossible agree to right NNSC send teams back south Korea while Communists continued in default.
2.
Swiss had never agreed to withdrawal with conditions and Swedes themselves had withdrawn from their original proposal.
3.
NNSC itself recommended to MAC unconditional withdrawal which we accepted and Communists rejected.
4.
To have accepted Communist conditions during June 4 and 7 MAC meetings would have required abandonment entire May 31 position and support something now unacceptable both Swiss and Swedes.
5.
No purpose could have been served by delaying UNC action further following June 7 MAC meeting since then clear agreement not possible on basis NNSC recommendation and we could not accept Communist conditions.
6.
Within time limits dictated by Communists we made every effort consult with 16 and UNC action entirely in accord instructions made known to 16 on June 6.5

French and Netherlands expressed views similar British also under instructions.6 Australians and Canadians discussed matter with [Page 280] Department primarily from standpoint explaining U.S. position to Foreign Offices.

British fear lest Communists exploit our endorsement Swedish proposal May 28 note while rejecting same proposal June 4 MAC meeting.

FYI: British reply Chinese Communist note said 16 supported Swiss and Swedish proposals referred to in that note thus permitting interpretation 16 supported proposal NNSC withdraw while retaining right send teams military zones. This resulted from inadvertence in joint drafting. Actually Swiss never supported such conditional withdrawal and such conditional withdrawal cannot be reconciled with position taken by UNC in MAC on May 31 of which 16 fully informed at time note to Peiping approved. End FYI.

Apparent inconsistency May 28 note and positions May 31 MAC announcement discussed with Allies here but should not be discussed publicly. If necessary explain you should say British note expressed situation before UNC statement in MAC and before unanimous NNSC recommendation to MAC that all teams be withdrawn without conditions attached.

Department expressed hope to British they would not publicly indicate difference this issue.7

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–856. Secret. Drafted by Nes, approved by Murphy, and cleared by Robertson and with UNP, EUR, and L/UNA. Sent to London, Seoul, Paris, Bern, Stockholm, Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, The Hague, and Tokyo.
  2. A memorandum of conversation among British Minister Graves, British Counselor de la Mare, Hemmendinger, and Nes, prepared by Nes, is ibid.
  3. Telegram FE 202012, June 7, from CINCUNC to the Secretary of Defense for Assistant Secretary Gray, conveyed a verbatim transcript of the 72d meeting of the MAC on June 7. The KPA/CPV representative agreed, in light of the unanimous recommendation by the NNSC, that the NNITs should be temporarily withdrawn to the demilitarized zone, but insisted that the NNSC retain the authority to despatch mobile teams as necessary. General Gard refused to accept the conditions for agreement, and the meeting adjourned on Gard’s observation that the UNC intended to effect the withdrawal as announced on May 31. (Ibid., NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Defense Cables In and Out NNSC 1956)
  4. A memorandum of a telephone conversation between Graves and Hemmendinger, prepared by Hemmendinger, is ibid., Central Files, 795.00/6–756.
  5. Hemmendinger explained to representatives of the Sixteen that the U.N. Command intended to proceed with the announced withdrawal, to be accomplished by June 9. The Australian, New Zealand, and Netherlands representatives argued for flexibility rather than a firm deadline, but Hemmendinger gave no indication that the United States considered the matter open to further discussion. (Memorandum of conversation by Brown, June 6; ibid., UNP Files: Lot 64 D 167, Gen Corresp)
  6. Minister Millet informed Hemmendinger on June 8 that the French Government was concerned over the “hasty” decision to proceed with the removal of the NNSC teams from South Korea, and felt that the action should be held up briefly. (Memorandum of conversation by Norred, June 8; ibid., Central Files, 795.00/6–856) Netherlands Minister Baron S.G.M. van Voorst also called on Hemmendinger on June 8 to state that he had received instructions from his government to inform the Department that the Netherlands felt that the United States had not used the possibilities open to it to get the Swedish proposal accepted. He asked that CINCUNC be instructed to delay removal of the NNITs and seek to secure agreement on withdrawal of the teams. (Memorandum of conversation by Norred, June 8; ibid.)
  7. On June 9, the U.N. Command removed the 16 remaining NNSC personnel from the Republic of Korea to Panmunjom without incident. (Telegram 1237 from Seoul, June 9; ibid., 795.00/6–956) The British Government did not indicate publicly that it considered the UNC action to be precipitate.