72. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 6, 19551
SUBJECT
- Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
PARTICIPANTS
- Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles
- Mr. Gordon Gray, Asst. Secretary of Defense
- Admiral Radford and Mr. Charles Sullivan, Department of Defense
- CIA—Messrs. Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner
- USIA—Messrs. Streibert and Berding
- C—Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II
- FE—Assistant Secretary Mr. Robertson
- PSA—James D. Bell
The Secretary stated that the meeting had been called to discuss the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty which he described as having tremendous potentialities for good or evil.2 The Treaty, he said, was unique in two respects; it joined the West and Asia and it also joined Western colonial powers with states which only recently were colonies. The Treaty thus cuts across the Communist line of attempting to separate the former colonial peoples from former imperialist powers. This has great political significance, particularly as an example to other Asian countries. If the treaty leads to disappointment and futility, aid and comfort will be given to those who would break up this kind of alliance. The Treaty in itself helps combat Communist attempts to try and capture, capitalize on and exploit Nationalist movements in Asia. This world-wide Communist technique is presently endangering Africa and the Middle East and might now even be considered as jeopardizing the United Nations. The Soviet-Asia-Arab bloc is faced with SEATO as practically the only vehicle which can strike a counterblow.
We are challenged with the problem of making the Pact have greater vitality. A greater sense of fellowship is needed. However, we cannot reverse the policy of avoiding development of a NATO in the Far East and we must continue to adhere to our policy of not creating forces in being under the Treaty. It is not difficult to see that this causes a feeling of disappointment among the Asian powers and that they want something more substantial.
Perhaps we could accomplish more if the advantages and the significance in the over-all world picture were realized. Giving the Treaty a feeling of reality and substance provides advantages which are not confined to the particular operation. Whatever we may be [Page 146] able to carry forward under the Treaty will have a by-product value. In this respect it might be useful to have some joint maneuvers.
Admiral Radford at this point stated that Admiral Stump had, in fact, recently made arrangements to place an American destroyer under the command of the Pakistan Navy for a visit the Pakistan Naval Forces were making to Indonesia. Admiral Radford said that the Philippines were the most restless with respect to developments in the military field and that he had recently had Admiral Stump’s views on the subject. In fact, Admiral Radford said, considerable progress is being made on military matters.
Mr. MacArthur stated that under the agreement reached at Bangkok we were committed to a meeting on the Ministerial level early next year and that we must give serious thought to what should be discussed at that meeting. He said he felt good progress was being made in the military field and that the proposal for a research and analysis center by the Counter sub version Committee3 had been well received by the Asians. He suggested the desirability of making an assessment of what has been accomplished in the military planning, countersubversion, public information and political fields. It also is necessary to determine what is in the mill and can and should be accomplished between now and February, what projects should be pushed forward and what projects might be suitable for discussion at the Ministerial meeting. A good deal of this would be a matter of timing.
The Secretary stated that he believed we should arrive at some conclusion with respect to the time of the Ministerial meeting before going to Geneva, as any great delay might result in a number of other things arising which could block the holding of the Ministerial meeting.
Mr. MacArthur agreed fully and asked for the Secretary’s views.
Mr. Streibert raised the question of the anniversary of the Treaty which Mr. MacArthur pointed out has already passed.
The Secretary said that we should suggest the end of February or the beginning of March for the Ministerial meeting.
Mr. Berding suggested the meeting might be held in Karachi.
Mr. MacArthur suggested that Karachi was a little remote and isolated and that possibly we should not take any specific stand on a place for the meeting but rather elicit the views of others.
Mr. Streibert stated that from a point of view of getting publicity, which the Secretary had indicated he thought was desirable, it would be hard to accomplish very much without the establishment of a central public relations office. He stated that his people were [Page 147] working with the Department of State on an over-all plan that he thought was pretty good. In addition, he said that we must christen the organization, that we must reach agreement on what to call it. He pointed out that Manila Pact had too much connotation of the Philippines and that SEACDT could not be pronounced.
Mr. Streibert further said that it would be virtually impossible to achieve any publicity without having some substance on which to work. He particularly suggested some personality such as a Secretary-General, preferably an Asian.
In recent talks with Mr. Gray of Great Britain, Mr. Streibert learned that, although the British were “dragging their feet”, at a discussion of the public relations aspect of the Treaty in Bangkok this, according to Gray, does not represent the London view.
Mr. MacArthur indicated that the mere establishment of a public relations officer in a central place would not necessarily solve the problem. He stated that it is necessary to convince the Asians that they must make an impact on other Asians and sincerely work to build up the Treaty.
The Secretary referred to the desirability of bringing other states in the area into the Treaty. He mentioned specifically Indonesia. Mr. MacArthur suggested Ceylon might be the next state to adhere to the Treaty.
Mr. Berding raised the possibility of having certain other Pacific nations indicate their support of the Treaty or of the Pacific Charter. He mentioned specifically Chile, Peru and Mexico. He suggested the usefulness of obtaining some kind of a joint resolution from the Congresses of these states.
Admiral Radford stated in his view that the real immediate problem was to tackle the Laos and Viet-Nam situation. He cited particularly Laos in which fighting might begin within a month and a half. He stated that the Treaty would live or die depending on the attitude and action of SEATO with respect to the developments in Laos. If the Communists were permitted to take over the two northern provinces without any semblance of opposition or interest on the part of SEATO, the loss of prestige would be irretrievable. Therefore, our policy should be to take the lead in helping to solve such urgent problems which exist in the area right now.
Mr. Allen Dulles mentioned the fine work being done by the Filipinos in Free Viet-Nam through Operation Brotherhood.4
Mr. Robertson stated that British and French interest must be stimulated. He referred to the fact that the British and the French [Page 148] sabotaged the previous effort to consider and publicize the question of Laos by the Council Representatives.
The Secretary pointed out that after he had told Lao leaders that they would have SEATO help in the event of an emergency the French and the British gave the Lao contrary views.
Mr. Robertson observed that the British never really wanted SEATO. The Secretary agreed.
Admiral Radford pointed out that Australia had a great interest and was genuinely ready to help.
Mr. MacArthur said one aspect of the problem was that it would be impossible to get any precommitment with respect to action in an emergency by the Council even if the Prime Ministers were present. He said that it was impossible to make specific force commitments. However, it was his view that joint maneuvers would have the advantage of giving the appearance of practicing to come to the assistance of the Southeast Asian states.
Admiral Radford stated that the Southeast Asian states are aware that SEATO will be as effective as the United States wishes to make it. He recommended encouraging both the Thais and the Filipinos to give as much support as possible in helping to solve Southeast Asian problems. He questioned the possibility of very extensive joint maneuvers and said that the publicity would be limited and then only in the countries involved in the area. Mr. MacArthur said that was just where we wanted the publicity.
With respect to Laos, Admiral Radford stated that we should demonstrate our willingness to help through the Thais. The Admiral then read from a telegram from the Embassy in Bangkok5 setting forth some of the actions which might be taken through Thailand to strengthen the Lao Government. Admiral Radford stated he thought the proposals in the telegram were the sort of thing which might usefully be undertaken.
Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that some Laotians were being trained in Thailand. He also mentioned briefly the proposal to establish a research and analysis center at which overt material on Communism and Communist activities would be gathered and analyzed.
Mr. Wisner stated that at the recent meeting of the countersubversive group in Manila an agreed estimate on the Lao security situation had been obtained. He also said that further accomplishments could be achieved in (1) exchange of information on Communist personalities and activities and (2) mutual assistance to control the movements of Communist personalities and materials. He suggested that further accomplishments might be sought in the fields of police [Page 149] and security services by bringing such activities under the Pact, possibly through a joint training center in the area.
Mr. Bell briefly reviewed the accomplishments of the Karachi meeting of economic experts6 with particular reference to agreement on questionnaires and reports with respect to economic dislocation due to obligations assumed under the Treaty.
It was suggested that thought might be given to having Malaya become a member of SEATO. Mr. MacArthur stated that this would pose a number of exceedingly complex problems.
Mr. MacArthur suggested the desirability of getting an assessment of what had been accomplished to date under the Treaty; what kind of reports had been made by the various Committees and subcommittees; and what sort of reports should be made to the Council and to the Council Representatives. The purpose would be to see where we are and how we are to progress in the future. Such an assessment would include a review of the work in progress and suggestions as to possible future developments. Such an assessment should be useful in helping draw up an agenda for the meeting at the Ministerial level.7
With respect to a name for the organization, at Mr. MacArthur’s request, the Secretary said he would be willing to accept the term “SEATO” which is widely used in the area.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5n0–655. Secret. Drafted by Bell. A typed uninitialed marginal note reads: “This has not been cleared and is an informal record of the meeting. No Distribution to overseas posts nor other U.S. Government agencies, (per C—Mr. MacArthur)” In an attached note dated October 12 to Robert G Barnes., Director of the Executive Secretariat, Richard R. Selby of the Reports and Operations Staff stated that the memorandum “was not cleared with the Secretary on Mr. MacArthur’s instructions.”↩
- This meeting was called by Dulles after MacArthur had so recommended in a memorandum to the Secretary dated October 1. “We are faced with a serious situation with respect to the development of the Manila Pact because of the general impression, held very strongly by the three Asian members, that the Manila Pact organization has bogged down and nothing really constructive is being accomplished.” MacArthur had then pointed out that positive accomplishments should be on record by the time of the next Manila Pact ministerial meeting and that measures to this end should be concerted on an interagency basis. (Ibid., 790.5/10–155)↩
- The Counter-Subversion Committee of the SEACDT had most recently met in Manila, September 12–17. Documentation on the meeting is Ibid., Central File 790.5.↩
- For a description of the origins of Operation Brotherhood, see Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 168 ff.↩
- Not identified.↩
- The Economic Experts Meeting of the SEACDT was held June 20–23. Documentation is in Department of State, Central File 790.5.↩
- In a letter to Gordon Gray, October 11, MacArthur stated that the Secretary had designated William J. Sebald to head an ad hoc interagency working group (State, Defense, CIA, USIA) to achieve the purposes described in this paragraph. (Ibid., FE Files: Lot 56 D 679)↩