Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, March 21, 1957—1 a.m.

2160. From Richards. Following are my impressions of Libya:

(1) Desert kingdom completely dependent upon outside subsidy from some source. In foreseeable future cannot hope to become viable without subsidy. Similar in many respects to Jordan before influx of Palestinians.

(2) Functioning of government actually most primitive although decked with trappings of modem parliamentary state. People have no awareness of ideologies. Government based on respect for King and on personal loyalties with Ben Halim apparently for present in control.

(3) Libya may be likened to marionette with at least three outside puppeteers (Egypt, USSR and US), pulling strings. British influence fading.

(4) Presence of Wheelus air base and possibility other facilities will be established Cyrenaica make Libya of major strategic importance to US. GOC Seventeenth Air Force whose command responsibilities extend across North Africa and Middle East saw military need for establishment of Middle East Command with headquarters in Libya, and advance base at Habbaniya, Iraq which would be used in case of limited war and where he foresaw no difficulties in obtaining required US rights. If such arrangements were for any reason infeasible he suggested that better military coordination in area be achieved in some manner, and that military guidance for area flow directly from the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than through intervening operational commander. Wheelus base is self-contained unit capable of independent operation in time of war and (according base commander) with ability to provide its own perimeter protection in case of local disturbances. It obviously in US interest to foster political climate which will permit retention present US position. It is also in US interest to retain friendship of this Arab state, regardless of base rights, in order impede Soviet and pro-Soviet Egyptian influences from spreading throughout North Africa. Careful consideration should be given not only to immediate requirements but to long pull when from political evolution of Libya many of problems now faced in older Arab countries may be expected to emerge.

(5) Present government has committed itself firmly to west and Prime Minister has staked his political life on such course. Recent firm statements on President’s Middle East proposals give him little possibility of successfully reversing attitude. Position taken places him in opposition to USSR and to Egyptian concept of “positive neutrality”. Ben Halim is obviously counting on tangible assistance from US. Claims he already under strong attack from voice of Arabs and Moscow. US aid this year totals some $20 million ($14 million of economic development, technical cooperation and military assistance, $4 million special funds from Wheelus base agreement and over $2 million value of wheat shipment), in addition to contribution by Wheelus base of estimated $8 million to Libyan economy in terms of goods and services. US aid has shown steady rise and thus already provides demonstrable evidence value cooperation with US.

(6) However, we were told by Embassy most popular person in country is Nasser. His pictures appear throughout bazaar. He apparently has capability through emotional appeal to “street” to create disturbances for suppression of which government most dependent on efficient security forces.

(7) Egypt and Soviets have suffered reverse over past two years if situation is judged by position of present Libyan Government. Their efforts to satellize country have been rebuffed. However, relatively favorable situation depends upon small group of men now heading government and is not reflection of attitude people insofar as this can be judged. Thus sudden and drastic change could occur.

Problem confronting mission was not to explain ME proposals and obtain acceptance by Libyan Government but to determine level of aid required to satisfy Ben Halim and permit him to maintain successfully that cooperation with US pays in hard cash.

Reception accorded mission most friendly throughout. No efforts spared to show determination cooperate with west. Libyans advanced shopping list of approximately $30 million consisting of broadcasting system, Tripoli power plant, telecommunications network, reconstruction Benghazi port and assistance in field of education. From preliminary talks with Embassy and Libyan technicians clear idea did not emerge of magnitude of aid which would satisfy Libyans.

I decided to offer economic assistance of $4.5 million, increase of $200,000 over proposal developed in Washington, but with composition considerably changed to include broadcasting ($2.5 million) assistance in field of education ($1.5 million) economic development survey ($300,000) and material for municipal water system ($200,000). Largest US contributions, in fields of broadcasting and education would go where greatest immediate benefits might be obtained in terms of political impact and of directly countering Soviet and Egyptian efforts. At present Libyan airwaves dominated by radio Cairo. Assistance offered would permit construction of 50 kilowatt station in Tripoli and 5 kilowatt station in Benghazi together with necessary technical and programming training and manufacture of inexpensive ($10) receivers tuned to radio Libya. Aid to education intended to accelerate program for removal of Egyptian influence (one project would lead to gradual pull out of 300 Libyan students now in Egypt and sending them elsewhere overseas for study).

Re Tripoli power plant, USOM advised that $2.5 million loaned from development funds sufficient to meet cash requirements from 12 to 18 months. Benghazi port development expensive ($14 million) long range project with little immediate economic or political benefits. Telecommunications ($9 million) also appeared too expensive. Although Libyans showed no great enthusiasm for economic survey, LARC and USOM considered it priority requirement to provide basis for future planning.

Also I proposed police survey, intended assist in important objective of increasing Libyan capability maintain internal security.

Package as whole appeared particularly suited accomplish purposes President’s proposals.

No military assistance proposed. We maintained this should follow study by MAAG. Although not mentioned to Libyans, decision will also need to take account of future British role and US policy judgment on desirable tasks and capability of Libyan force. Prime Minister mentioned desire for small air force and navy of patrol type vessels. We said procedures for providing equipment for 1,000 men already agreed to were completed and that material should arrive shortly after signature MDAP agreement.

Summary of proposal conveyed orally noon March 19 and aide-mémoire transmitted Embtel 2158² presented at meeting with Ben Halim afternoon same day. Deep Libyan disappointment, much greater than anticipated, quickly became apparent. British advisor Pitt-Hardacre predicted Prime Minister would be forced out. I emphasized limited availability of funds, strong sentiment in Congress against foreign aid, heavy demands elsewhere especially from countries right under Russian guns and large and increasing aid from US to Libya. After making clear mission had no authority commit funds beyond FY 1957, I endeavored to allay Libyan disappointment by expressing personal opinion Congress would eventually approve continuation of foreign aid programs and expectation that administration would seek substantial sums for Libya.

Ben Halim replied he understood position on funds. Libya firmly committed to west and question of repudiation of doctrine not involved. However $4.5 million figure bound to become public and would place him in impossible political position. Opponents would say he had sold Libya for $4.5 million. Ben Halim concluded that from Libyan domestic political point of view preferable leave matter on basis that Libya accepted doctrine with only some general statement in communiqué about future US aid. He thought such position could be defended publicly. He earnestly urged mission to postpone final decision on aid to Libya until completion of trip and return to Washington when assessment relative needs area countries would be possible. He strongly emphasized importance of missions not rewarding “bad boys”. Ben Halim made clear he not rejecting aide-mémoire but only asking deferment in hopes eventually of obtaining more. He spoke with dignity and restraint despite obvious disappointment.

I put forward reasons for making decision now pointing out procedural difficulties involved in postponement, unlikelihood of increase and possibility funds would be exhausted. After prolonged discussion I agreed that mission, after completion of visits to other countries, would consider whether additional aid for Libya possible. Agreed position reflected in joint communiqué (Embtel 2159).³ Ben Halim accepted our original text, changing only paragraph regarding aid to be furnished.

I was profoundly impressed by Ben Halim and general Libyan attitude. There is no question of Libyan importance to west, desirability supporting present government and genuineness of Libyan needs. However in face of need and danger elsewhere, obvious impossibility of US making more than relatively small contribution to development needs so evident throughout the area, and large amount of aid already provided Libya in FY 1957, I thought it inadvisable to offer larger amount at this time. Small increase would not have met situation. Instead, increase in magnitude of $5 or more million would probably be required. However, I believe Libya has strong case and I may well make recommendations later for increase in aid level.

Hope we will have definite information on British intentions before time for final decision arrives. While most reluctant to see US assume such long-term commitment I see no alternative to picking up British subsidy if we are to achieve our objective of maintaining a Libyan entity friendly to west. British, of course, should be urged to carry part of burden. Once this matter settled we will be in better position decide upon rounded package which could satisfy present government and justify its pro-west policy.

Action requested from Washington: (1) Comments on proposed aid package (Tripoli should submit to Department soonest complete information on project); (2) expeditious delivery of equipment for 1,000 men; (3) arrangements for survey of police force. Embassy Tripoli could discuss survey with Libyans apart from aid question as whole; (4) policy determination re British subsidy and military role.

Warren

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2157. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tripoli, Cairo, Tehran, London, Karachi, Paris, New Delhi, Rome, Addis Ababa, Amman, Athens, Baghdad, Damascus, Kabul, Jidda, Khartoum, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tunis, and Beirut. Regarding Richards’ mission, see Document 17.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Not printed. (Ibid.)