Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

361. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 6, 1957¹

Washington, August 6, 1957

SUBJECT

• Review of United States–Israel Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Yohanan Meroz, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
• The Secretary
• NEA—Lampton Berry
• NE—Donald C. Bergus

Mr. Eban stated that he was shortly departing for Israel to remain three weeks, during which time Mr. Meroz would be in charge. One of the objects of his visit was a review with the Israel Government of outstanding matters prior to the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly this fall. He believed that the United States and Israel had reached a degree of cooperation which was satisfying not only with respect to the restoration of relations since the Suez crisis but good in itself.

The picture in the NE was not serene. While there was no unity among the Arab states with regard to Nasser and there was in some countries disillusionment with the USSR, the Arabs were still united in their opposition to Israel. One result of the split in the Arab world had been that both factions sought to increase their armaments. Israel was deeply concerned at continuing Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt and Syria, but there was also concern at deliveries which the United States and others were making to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Israel did not like to see arms become the symbol of cooperation with an Arab state, and felt strongly that economic and social aid was much more beneficial.

Israel was concerned at the growth in strength of the Arab boycott and particularly at the decision of the British firms of Shell and British Petroleum to withdraw from Israel without even attempting to make satisfactory succession arrangements as had been the case with Socony.² There was now a report that Imperial Chemical Industries, under pressure mainly from Iraq, was thinking of pulling out. Israel hoped that the United States might be able to counteract this trend which seemed to be taking place in the United Kingdom. The Israelis were giving thought to raising this whole question in the United Nations but it was difficult to find a legal approach.

Israel remained troubled by Soviet threats and accusations, the latest of which was to accuse Israel of being about to invade Syria and to state that Syria would not be alone in such an event. Israel was reluctant to conclude that the Soviets wished to provoke the Syrians into a rash military action but Mr. Eban wished to draw attention to Israel’s concern, in view of the American Doctrine.

Mr. Eban said that there had been little trouble between Egypt and Israel lately because the UNEF had sealed off two points of conflict. Israel hoped the United States would agree that an early withdrawal of the UNEF would be premature and take steps in the United Nations to maintain it.³

On Aqaba, Israel had continued to pursue a policy of peaceful and unpublicized exercise of its right of innocent passage. Seven or eight tankers and other vessels had proceeded to Eilath. Israel thought it would be better if the United States made no statements which appeared to indicate doubt as to the validity of its position or to invite litigation. The proximity of litigation sometimes invited incidents as, for example, in Cyprus and North Africa.

Mr. Eban noted that two specific problems with a bearing on Arab-Israel relations were scheduled to be discussed in the forthcoming UNGA. These were financing of UNEF and UNRWA. Israel wondered if this were the time for more specific movement in the UNGA toward an Arab-Israel settlement. In the past, the Israelis had felt that, since there was little prospect of progress on outstanding issues, broad UNGA discussion would not be very useful. If the United States were coming to hold a different view, it would be appreciated if it could share its thoughts with Israel. The Israelis sensed a growing concern in this country over the refugee problem. They felt that although Israel could make a contribution to a solution of this problem, the main effort would have come from the Arabs. If there were an overall scheme which looked to a solution of the whole problem, there were things Israel could do.

Mr. Eban noted that the Export-Import Bank Mission had completed its work in Israel. The Israelis believed the mission had obtained a favorable impression. Mr. Eban noted that Congressional action had been completed on PL–480 legislation, and that Israel had submitted an application for $48 million worth of agricultural commodities. He hoped that early and favorable action could be taken.

Mr. Eban expressed his Government’s interest in high-level United States participation in Israel’s forthcoming tenth anniversary celebration and his hope that it might be possible for the Israel Prime Minister to be invited to the United States.

The Secretary said that with regard to Mr. Eban’s statement concerning closer understanding between our two Governments, he agreed that we now talked with more intimacy and confidence than we had even before last November. We had had to place confidence in each other and each had come to feel that he was justified in so doing. This was a basis for greater trust in the future.

We also were concerned by the fact that whereas the Arab world was divided with respect to Nasser, it seemed to be united in its opposition to Israel. The Secretary did not know to what extent there was genuine unity or whether Israel was just a good thing for politicians to talk about. There was some unity in the conduct of the Arab boycott where the mechanism had been established for some time. The Secretary did not discount an unchanged basic animosity toward Israel. There was also an animosity towards the United Kingdom.

Recent developments in Oman⁴ were a matter of concern to us because here again there seemed to be a plausible excuse to unite the Arabs against the West. This made it difficult for us to implement a policy of discouraging extreme Arab nationalism and promoting closer ties with the West and less close ties with the USSR. The Secretary hoped that the Oman trouble would be quickly over, but it was difficult to be confident that a few days could bring a result.

On arms, the Secretary agreed that economic and social development was much more important. He had repeatedly pointed out to the Arabs the folly of wasting resources on arms which were difficult to maintain and use effectively. We did not encourage Saudi Arabia or other states to acquire large quantities of arms but tried to hold down their requests to an irreducible minimum.

On the Arab boycott and the withdrawal of British firms, the Secretary would bear in mind the Israel suggestion that we speak to the British but he did not know if an occasion for our doing so would arise or what we could say to them. In London, the Secretary had received the impression that the British regretted this step but felt it was inevitable.

On the Soviet attitude toward Israel, we inclined to the view that the USSR would not provoke an overt incident that would bring us militarily into the scene but, of course, we could not be sure. The Syrian border situation seemed to have calmed down. The Secretary General seemed to be concerned about the problem of United Nations observers along the frontier. There appeared to be some question of the mobility of observers on the Israel side of the line. The Secretary expressed the hope that Mr. Eban would look into the problem while he was in Israel. Israel reluctance with respect to the mobility of United Nations observers put Israel constantly on the defensive and created the suspicion that Israel might be up to mischief. This was the greatest single handicap to Israel’s United Nations relations. He urged Mr. Eban to seek greater acceptance in Israel of the need to cooperate with the United Nations observers.

The Secretary said that we hoped the UNEF could continue in its mission.

On Aqaba, the Secretary expressed appreciation for the Israel Government’s cooperation in the exercise of what we considered to be its right in a way to minimize Arab opposition. We were still having a difficult exchange of views with King Saud on this subject. It was difficult to exaggerate the King’s sentimental attachment to what he considered to be a sacred highway for pilgrims. Israel’s tying up its naval units had been extremely helpful and we hoped this would continue. We did not expect an Israel undertaking which would have the effect of limiting its freedom of action but we appreciated what had been done. Mr. Eban said that what his Government had said with respect to the tying up of warships and the conditions under which they would remain tied up would hold. The Secretary said that this was reassuring. Despite rumors to the contrary, we were unwilling to modify our position on the Gulf of Aqaba. All we have said was that we recognized the right of people to challenge our views through the appropriate international procedures. The Secretary referred to our global position with respect to freedom of the seas and stated that we were presently studying the recent Russian declaration with regard to the Bay of Vladivostok and might be making some sort of public statement about it.

The Secretary knew of no plans whereby UNGA action in the overall Palestine problem would be sought. We intended to support the continuance of UNEE As to the refugee problem, the Secretary had asked his associates to restudy the question. He felt that we were drifting into a bad situation with respect to the refugees and that we could not for long go on paying simply to keep the refugees alive. The Secretary recalled his recent press conference statement that perhaps the initiative in the Arab-Israel problem should be taken by another country in view of the rather controversial position which the United States now had in the area.⁵ This did not mean that we had lost interest or vigilance. If we had any ideas, we would consider whether we or others might put them forward. We had no new ideas at this moment although he had asked that a restudy be made. He hoped that Israel would give us its ideas as to what might be done.

As to PL–480, Israel’s position would be taken into account. There were, however, a number of claimants and the long-term future of the PL–480 program was by no means certain.

We looked with sympathy on the suggestion for United States participation in the tenth anniversary ceremonies and the possibility of a visit to the United States by the Israel Prime Minister. The former would be much easier inasmuch as the President had a heavy schedule of official visits running well into the next year. Nevertheless, the Secretary would take the question up with the President.

The Secretary concluded that at times he was despondent regarding the Middle East and its problems, but Israel had to live with them. We would maintain our interest in the area which was vital to us in so many ways. He felt, however, that since the Soviets had started to make trouble in the area, we would have to live with its problems for a considerable time. He had thought at one time we might be able to find an overall solution to the Palestine problem and this had led to his August 26, 1955 speech. The problems of the area, however, were difficult of solution even without the Russians. Now, he did not feel hopeful as to the prospects of an overall early settlement, since there was too much evil loose in the area. Therefore, we must live with the problems on a crisis-to-crisis basis, perhaps until there were a basic change in Soviet thinking or other developments took place. Mr. Eban said that Israel did not envisage shortcuts to solutions which only time and faith could probably bring. Israel took comfort in the fact that next year it would be celebrating its tenth anniversary. The Secretary said he would be glad to discuss these questions further with Mr. Eban when he returned from Israel. The prospects of an overall solution appeared dim. Perhaps we should work on it piecemeal with a start on the refugee problem.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/8–657. Secret. Drafted by Bergus on August 7. Prior to this meeting Rountree forwarded to Dulles a briefing memorandum which discussed possible topics of discussion and recommended responses. (Ibid., 611.84A/8–657) The Department of State transmitted a summary of the conversation to the Embassy in Tel Aviv in telegram 113, August 6. (Ibid., 684A.86/8–657)
2. Documentation concerning the withdrawal of British oil firms from Israel is ibid., 880.2553.
3. Documentation concerning withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force is ibid., 320.5780.
4. In July 1957, the Imam of Oman had taken up arms against the Sultan of Muscat. The insurrection was eventually suppressed with British support. For documentation concerning U.S. interest in the matter, see vol. XIII, pp. 226 ff.
5. Reference is to Dulles’ press conference of July 16; see Department of State Bulletin, August 5, 1957, p. 232.