Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

143. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, February 24, 1957, 3:30 p.m.¹

Washington, February 24, 1957, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Israeli Withdrawal

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli Minister
• The Secretary
• Christian A. Herter—U
• Francis O. Wilcox—IO
• Herman Phleger—L
• William M. Rountree—-NEA

Ambassador Eban said he wished to convey the personal greetings of the Prime Minister and his Government to the President and the Secretary. He had been in Jerusalem for only thirty hours, having returned to Washington with the greatest urgency to communicate the position of his Government on the question of withdrawal. The Prime Minister had understood the attitude of the United States and hoped to achieve a closer understanding of our respective positions. The country was in a state of suspense regarding the outcome of discussions in Washington and in the United Nations. The Government felt that its basic aspirations were reasonable and just, and had great pride and gratitude regarding the sympathy throughout the world which the Israeli position had evoked. At the same time, the Government was anxious to proceed in a manner which would be conducive to a solution.

Continuing, the Ambassador said the Prime Minister had been impressed by the American position based upon its interest in global peace. It shared fully our concern that the “universal interest” should be taken fully into account, and his obligation to help preserve peace was fully in his mind. He also had been greatly impressed with the willingness of the President and the Secretary to speak of the current problems in terms of assuring Israel that it could rely on the United States and the United Nations if it withdrew. This, he said, had struck a responsive echo. On the other hand, it was not easy to undertake every decision objectively in view of the nature of the proposals which had been put forward at the United Nations by the six powers which would impose sanctions upon Israel. Such an attitude could do nothing but hinder, rather than help, a solution.

The Ambassador said he had outlined to the Secretary before his trip the positions of his Government. He was now prepared to state how those positions might be amended. First, regarding the Gulf of Aqaba, the Secretary would recall the Israeli feeling that, because of the vital national interest involved, Israel would have been justified in seeking firm guarantees before withdrawal. These guarantees might have taken the form of an agreement regarding the status of the UNEF and an arrangement for that force to remain until a permanent settlement had been achieved. Alternatively, it might have taken the form of international guarantees for Israeli shipping through the Straits. The Ambassador had conveyed the difficulties which the United States had seen in each of these alternatives, and the Israeli Government had concluded that it would not be realistic to expect such guarantees. It therefore would retire from that kind of request. In doing so, however, it must consider other means which would provide less formal assurances. Since they were retiring—and many would think this was a serious recession—Israel would ask if the United States was willing to help in ways which were consistent with international law and were within the general framework of the February 11 Aide-Mémoire. The Government had been impressed with the declaration of intent by the United States concerning its rights in the Gulf and Straits. It hoped that this was not merely symbolic but that United States flag vessels would in fact use the Straits. Israel would like to feel confident that American flag vessels would be available for commerce by this route, at least insofar as the attitude of the United States Government was concerned. If this was assured, there would be a definite interest in our maintaining free passage.

With respect to the formulation in the Aide-Mémoire of United States recognition of free and innocent passage, the terms employed might not be understood by persons not familiar with legal language. It would be helpful, the Ambassador said, if the United States could endorse wording used by Hyde,² and state in substance that innocent passage meant the passage of a ship whose conduct was not detrimental to the state whose territory was being passed. In other words, it should be made clear that ships should be permitted to pass so long as the ships themselves did not misbehave.

In receding from its previous position, Israel would be accepting the unfortunate estimate that the United Nations was not able to provide for the UNEF on Egyptian soil assuredly to stay there until peace had been established. The Israeli Government was interested in a proposal which had been put forward by other governments that United Nations forces might include, in addition to land units, naval vessels to patrol waters which would be of a less sovereign character than the land itself. Clearly, he said, patrolling south of the Straits outside Egyptian territorial waters might be easier than maintaining forces on the Sinai Peninsula itself. It would be much more difficult for any single state to prevent such a patrol from serving its purpose, and thus the arrangement would provide greater stability than if the forces were on land only. Presumably that would require a decision by the General Assembly, although the Secretary General might find it possible under his present powers to move in a sea unit. Egypt, he said, might find it easier from the point of view of its prestige to permit such an arrangement to be maintained longer than land occupation.

The Ambassador said that he would like to discuss an important aspect of the matter which might be decisive with respect to the Israeli decision to withdraw. It appeared reasonably safe to say that ships of countries other than Israel would be permitted to pass through the Straits, but the Israeli Government was apprehensive that Egypt might stop Israeli ships. It was out of that consideration that arose the request for guarantees. The United States, he said, could protect American flag vessels but could not provide protection for vessels flying other flags. In order to insure against the illicit use of force, Israel must itself provide that guaranty for its own ships. Thus Israel was prepared to state that it would protect, within the limits of the United Nations Charter, the freedom of passage of its own vessels. Israel would seek American understanding of such a declaration on the basis that if the United States had the power to speak with respect to its own vessels it followed that Israel likewise had the right to do so with respect to its own. The thought was that declaration of the Israeli intention would serve as a deterrent. Israel’s legal advisers were now drafting such a declaration which would be shown to the Secretary after it had been completed. The Ambassador would like for the Secretary to say that Israel had a right to make such a declaration, provided it was legal and within the United Nations Charter. Presumably Egypt would think twice before obstructing Israeli vessels if it knew that such action would encounter an Israeli reaction. The Ambassador emphasized that of all of the considerations involved in the Israeli Government’s willingness to retire from its original position regarding the Straits, this was the most decisive.

Continuing, the Ambassador said his Government had noted the reference in the Aide-Mémoire to the United States willingness to join with others in asserting its rights to use the Straits. It would be extremely valuable if the United States doctrine were widely shared and expressed by other maritime powers. It was hoped particularly that Panama and Liberia might be persuaded to join in such a declaration, since flag vessels of those countries did substantial shipping business in the Middle East. The Ambassador indicated that France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had shown a disposition to adhere to the American concept, although there might be some divergencies in the form which declarations by those countries might take. It was recognized that arrangements for such declarations might take time, and the Israeli Government was not suggesting that its withdrawal be delayed until the arrangements had been completed. It was, however, important to know the United States attitude.

The Ambassador said there were certain additional observations which he would like to make regarding the Straits, but they were of less importance than the ones he had mentioned. For example, he said, the Aide-Mémoire of February 11 had stated that the UNEF should move in after the withdrawal of Israeli forces, but there was no reference there to its mission or duration. On January 28 and February 2 Ambassador Lodge had expressed the hope that the force would prevent belligerent acts and would stay until peace had been restored. Israel hoped that, insofar as the U.S. as a member of the United Nations was concerned, it would continue to maintain that position. He understood that we considered it unlikely that the United Nations could formalize such an arrangement. The Ambassador feared that after withdrawal of Israeli forces, the UNEF would soon be removed from Egypt and then Egyptian forces would move in. Then the only deterrent to Egyptian action might be the declaration made by Israel. It would be useful, he said, if the U.S. could say that it looked at the UNEF task along the lines stated by Ambassador Lodge.

If it were not possible to get general United Nations endorsement of that principle—as many delegations would like—the Israeli Government hoped that the Secretary General could be persuaded to say that, if a proposal should be made to remove the UNEF, he would give the General Assembly an opportunity to consider the matter; thus a time of, say, ten days would be provided for United Nations consideration before the forces were withdrawn. If that should be done, and the U.S. and other delegations could then say that they did not feel that the forces should be withdrawn, Israel could feel that premature action would not be taken. This should not cause difficulty, he said, since the Secretary General had stated on February 7 that the Assembly had reserved for itself the right to determine the conditions under which the force should operate and be withdrawn. The Ambassador felt that if the Secretary General knew how much it meant to Israel, he would not hesitate to agree to inform the General Assembly before any withdrawal.

Alluding again to the fact that the February 11 Aide-Mémoire had said that only UNEF forces should be put into the area, its functions not having been defined, the Ambassador recalled that in his speech three days ago the President had used a phrase, not in the Aide-Mémoire, that “the force should move in for the purpose of assuring non-belligerency”. The Ambassador observed that he should perhaps ask for clarification of our position, since if that were our joint understanding it would be extremely helpful.

The Ambassador then referred to what he called intangibles. When all the things he had mentioned had been done there would be deterrents, but no guarantees. Israel would be withdrawing in response to the United States feeling that, while no guarantees were possible, Israel should put its faith in the sense of responsibility of those who were recommending the withdrawal. The Secretary had said that the United States would use the full measure of its influence in an effort to bring about realization of Israel’s legitimate interests. The United States was thus giving moral encouragement to Israel. His Government had instructed him to say that Israel would withdraw forces on receipt of guarantees, or upon arrangements for the stationing of UNEF forces with suitable terms of reference, or upon the development of some “other methods” to provide reasonable assurances. It now felt that some of these “other methods” might be put together to constitute a basis for withdrawal. He thought he should now ask the Secretary General to set up a meeting with General Burns to arrange for withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Straits area. In that context, Israel would seek agreement with the proposals which he had outlined.

The Ambassador said he wished to turn to what he called the link between Gaza and the Straits. The Prime Minister had felt that there would be wisdom in proceeding in arrangements for withdrawal from the Straits even if all aspects of the Gaza problem would take a longer time to settle. However the United States had said that if Egypt should interfere with Israeli shipping in the Gulf and in the Suez Canal at a time when Israel was in military occupation, Egypt could properly say that it was meeting one belligerent act with another. Israel proposed that the United States agree that Israeli rights to free passage would be fully operative, not when the whole of the Gaza problem was settled but when Israeli forces withdraw and after the UNEF had taken up their positions in the Straits and Gaza area. At that time the problem of working out the United Nations’ relationship with the civil administration would be under active consideration. Israeli lawyers believed that if the UNEF were on hand in Gaza, it could not be stated that Israel was in a state of belligerency. The Ambassador hoped that the United States would “establish” this Israeli concept.

Thus, the Ambassador said, he proposed that on the question of the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel would retire from its demand for guarantees and would compensate for the lack of such guarantees by a patchwork of existing statements and a unilateral Israeli declaration regarding its right to protect its flag vessels. With respect to Gaza, Israel recognized that it was farther away from a majority of the United Nations on this issue than on the Straits issue. It had been the Israeli position that Israel would withdraw only provided its civil administration continued. Israel no longer insisted on this. In fact, there was only one thing that Israel was against: that was the installation of the status quo ante with the reinstitution of Egyptian control in Gaza. Israel now favored the UNEF being in control of Gaza, with an international civil administration as an interim measure. Surely, he said, while the future settlement of Gaza was being arranged, it would be illogical to restore the old regime.

Continuing, the Ambassador stated that Israeli opposition to the return to the status quo ante stemmed from security considerations. He thought there was no legal justification for supporting Egyptian rights as before. If it were the Egyptian position that it was in a state of war with Israel, there could be no obligation to restore Egyptian rights in the territory. There was no legal authority which said that Egypt had the right to invoke the Armistice Agreement after having itself violated the agreement for eight years.

The Ambassador would suggest procedures along the following lines: Israeli representatives would attempt by compromise to solve the Straits problem; Israel would withdraw from the Straits area; the United Nations forces would enter by land, and perhaps by sea. Thereafter, Israeli forces would be withdrawn from Gaza; the UNEF would move into that area. At that stage the General Assembly or another appropriate United Nations body would send to Gaza a mission to deal with all of the problems and to hear the views of the states concerned. The mission would recommend interim administrative arrangements for Gaza. It might rule against Israel; but Israel asked only to be heard. It might say that the United Nations administration should maintain some relationship with Israel, with Egypt, or with both. In this connection, the Ambassador had noted the Secretary General’s statement of February 22 concerning the Egyptian attitude regarding the UN role in the administration of Gaza. He did not know the significance of that statement, but thought it might be helpful; however, he had noted that the Egyptians already had made statements denouncing it.

The Ambassador said that the only indispensable condition with respect to Gaza was that the solution must not be an Egyptian solution. The only thing that Israel would say “no” to was the return of Egypt to Gaza. Anything else that was reasonable, Israel would accept.

Concluding his presentation, the Ambassador observed that the President had said that he did not think we should assume that Egypt would deny to Israeli ships passage through the Suez Canal. He would welcome some statement that that represented the policy of the United States. Also, Israel would ask other nations to say something along these lines based upon principles of international law.

The Secretary commented that the Ambassador had made a constructive and masterly presentation of his Government’s views. He suggested a short intermission so that he could consult with his colleagues before responding.³

After a fifteen minute interval, the meeting with Ambassador Eban was resumed. The Secretary said that further reflection had confirmed his belief that the Israeli Government appeared to have made a sincere and constructive effort to find a solution to the problem. The Secretary felt confident that if the matter could be worked out—and he did not wish to under-estimate remaining difficulties— Israel would not have cause to regret its stand.

Regarding the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits, the Secretary recalled that the Ambassador had inquired whether it was the intention of the United States to maintain trade routes through these waters. That was our intention, although the Ambassador should understand that we could not impose our will upon shipowners; the United States Government had no power to compel American flag ships to go to any particular place. We would assume, however, that the vessels would go into the Gulf of Aqaba, and if there should be any avoidance of the Straits because of apprehensions of a sub-normal character, we would seek to allay those apprehensions.

Regarding the Ambassador’s question concerning the definition of free and innocent passage, the Secretary said there was a more recent and perhaps more authoritative statement on this subject than that of Hyde, and which more nearly reflected our own position. He referred to the definition in the International Law Commission’s report. At the Secretary’s suggestion, Mr. Phleger read this definition.⁴ The Ambassador commented that that appeared satisfactory since it referred to the conduct of vessels and not what they might carry. Responding to the Ambassador’s query, Mr. Phleger said that while the report had not yet been accepted, the United States had endorsed it and we felt that the position set forth in it was sound.

The Secretary referred to the Ambassador’s comments concerning the inclusion in the UNEF of naval units. He judged that there might be authority under existing resolutions adopted by the General Assembly to have naval units with the force, if circumstances indicated that they would be useful to prevent acts of belligerency. The United States would be prepared to support this concept if the situation seemed to call for it. He thought it would be largely a question of the Secretary General seeking the advice of his Committee in giving effect to a proposal that naval units be included. The Ambassador observed that one of the members of the Secretary General’s committee had in fact made a proposal along these lines, and thought there was no important opposition to the idea. A representative of Norway had supported the plan on the basis that forces stationed on naval vessels would be far more comfortable than those stationed at the remote land area adjacent to the Straits. The Secretary remarked that naval forces might, by virtue of being in a more comfortable situation, serve to prolong the life of the UNEF, which might be a desirable result in itself.

Turning to the next question which had been raised by the Ambassador, the Secretary stated his understanding that Israel would want United States’ acceptance of it being in conformity with the Charter and the principles of international law for Israel to make a declaration regarding its inherent right to protect its own ships, and that an attack on ships carrying out peaceful missions through the Straits would give rise to the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. The Secretary saw no inherent obstacle to United States recognition of such a declaration, subject, of course, to our seeing the language which might be employed.

With respect to the Israeli suggestion concerning our joining with others in declaring the intention to exercise our own right of passage, the Secretary said we had received indications from other maritime powers of their willingness either to join with us or to make similar but separate declarations. It might be wise to have each nation make its own declaration, because of preferences of the respective Legal Advisers as to the wording which should be employed. We had, in fact, seen language drafted by another maritime power, but thought our own wording to be better for our own purposes.

The Ambassador said he had in mind that if our Aide-Mémoire of February 11 were sent formally to other maritime powers, it would be helpful. They could then draw upon it for their own statements.

The Secretary stated that we would be happy to see Panama and Liberia participate in any such declaration as suggested by the Ambassador. However, we had to recognize a fact, which some people overlook, that neither of these nations was fully receptive to American suggestions and often delighted in showing their independence of the United States. He thought it would be in the interest of these governments to assert their rights, since benefits would be derived from their getting vessels of their registry to participate competitively in trade. Thus the Secretary saw no great problem in getting them to go along with the general idea. The Ambassador commented that Israel had representatives in Panama and Liberia who could talk with those governments. The Secretary said we would be glad to be helpful, but it should not be assumed that it would be automatic that they would do what we might suggest.

Continuing, the Secretary referred to other points which the Ambassador had made concerning the question of the UNEF in the Straits area. We would be glad to reaffirm in an appropriate manner the views expressed by Ambassador Lodge on January 28 and February 2. He referred particularly to paragraphs 28 and 29 of the Secretary General’s report which had been approved by the General Assembly.⁵

The next point raised by the Ambassador, the Secretary said, was that the UNEF should not depart from the Straits area until the General Assembly had been given advance notice of such withdrawal. That seemed a reasonable proposal, and we would support it. The arrangement would, of course, have to be worked out with the Secretary General and we could not bind him in the matter. The Ambassador commented that he planned to ask the Secretary General whether the latter would permit the publication of a private document which had given the Israel Government the impression that the UNEF would not leave while “acts of belligerency were still possible”.

The Secretary observed that the Ambassador had suggested there be a clearer understanding with respect to the President’s statement that a function of the UNEF was to assure non-belligerency in the area. We would be glad to clarify this.

The Secretary said the Ambassador had referred generally to the fact that Israeli withdrawal under the circumstances which he had set forth involved an act of faith in the United States and in the United Nations, and that we should recognize that fact. As the Secretary had said earlier, he thought that Israel would have no cause to regret such a decision to withdraw.

Referring to the Ambassador’s suggestion that the Israeli right to passage through the Straits and Suez should be recognized when Israeli forces were withdrawn, without awaiting completion of arrangements regarding the administration of Gaza, the Secretary observed that this question arose in considering the link between the ending by Israel of acts of belligerency and the claim that Egypt had no right to exercise belligerent rights. The legal aspects of this question were discussed generally by the Secretary, Mr. Phleger and the Ambassador. Mr. Phleger thought that the matter would have to be explored with Mr. Hammarskjold. It appeared to him that, after the UNEF moved into Gaza, the Israeli administration would be at the behest of the United Nations’ force. The administration then presumably would have no power except that derived from the United Nations. If the Israeli civilian administration were simply carrying out instructions of the UNEF, it would seem that there no longer would be a question of military occupation or the exercise of belligerency.

Restating the proposition, the Secretary said that the Israeli officials presumably would be in Gaza under the authority of the UNEF. They would ultimately derive whatever authority they had from those who exercised power. Israel would no longer have power there. He thought that to be an acceptable view, but emphasized that this aspect should be discussed with the Secretary General.

The Ambassador repeated that a major consideration was that, if Israel solved the Aqaba problem and withdrew her forces, the United States would have no inhibitions regarding Israel’s right of passage.

Regarding the Gaza strip, the Secretary recalled that the Ambassador had said Israel was not against anything except a return to the status quo ante. He took it that that did not mean that every vestige of Egyptian presence must be removed, but meant that the administration must be approved by the United Nations. He did not believe that Israel could stipulate no Egyptian participation, but that that should be left to the United Nations. The Ambassador replied that the essential point was that the authority should be in the United Nations and not in Cairo. Once Egyptian troops were put back in Gaza, it would be hard to control the situation.

The Secretary did not consider it possible for the General Assembly to rewrite in essence the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, certainly not without the concurrence of both parties. The future of Gaza should be worked out on some basis which would involve Egyptian consent, and he believed that Egypt would acquiesce in some change. He thought the Secretary General’s statement of February 22 on the subject of Gaza⁶ should have gone a long way indeed toward meeting the preoccupation of the Israeli Government. What the Secretary General said coincided with what the Ambassador seemed to hope for. He had reason to believe that what the Secretary General said was agreeable to the Egyptian Government.

The Ambassador said that the Secretary General’s statement worried his government since it indicated a degree of subordination to Egypt. Moreover, there already had been denials from Egypt that the statement was agreeable to Egypt. That was an extremely sensitive point, which was the crux of the whole position with respect to Gaza. He would talk the matter over with the Secretary General to see what arrangements might be made. Mr. Shiloah interjected that even before the publication of Egyptian denials, the Israeli Government was extremely worried over Mr. Hammarskjold’s statement since it was indirect and vague. It appeared to imply the presence in Gaza of an Egyptian police force. The Secretary responded that he had not inferred from the statement that an Egyptian police force was contemplated. After reading the statement aloud, the Secretary thought it good and constructive.

The Ambassador stated that this aspect of the problem was so essential that the Secretary General should clarify his statement. Perhaps Mr. Hammarskjold knew something that he could not say publicly. The Ambassador must emphasize to him the strength of the Israeli position regarding Egyptian control of Gaza. He thought the concept of an Israeli civil administration in Gaza could be defended on its merits. Unfortunately, this had been regarded as involving a kind of annexation by Israel of Gaza, which was not the case. In order to proceed toward a settlement, Mr. Ben Gurion had decided not to make an issue of that on its merits, but merely to assure that Egyptian control would not be reinstituted. A purely United Nations operation would be acceptable, and if it were necessary to exclude Israel in order to exclude Egypt, Israel would agree.

The Secretary thought that if Mr. Eban were seeking denial of Egyptian rights under the Armistice Agreement, he was asking for more than Mr. Hammarskjold or the United Nations could give. His personal understanding of the situation was that, without confronting Egypt with an abrogation of rights which it had under the Armistice Agreement, Egypt would acquiesce to the non-exercise of those rights, letting the United Nations take over. The Secretary did not believe that the United Nations could obliterate Israeli rights under the Agreement, and thought that Israel would be the first to deny that the United Nations would have power to do so. The background of the situation presented a powerful case for United Nations administration, particularly since the people in the area were on the United Nations dole and many would starve if the United Nations should withdraw. However, it was important to arrive at such United Nations responsibility for civil administration by means other than tearing up the Armistice Agreement.

The Ambassador responded that this was an intricate and complex problem. For that reason his Government thought the appointment of a United Nations committee to look into it would be the best procedure. With Israeli forces out and the UNEF in, it could then be decided what the future should be. That would postpone finalizing the arrangements and remove the problem from its present tense atmosphere. The Secretary said that we would welcome such a committee, but the decision was up to the Secretary General and the United Nations.

Reverting to the Ambassador’s earlier presentation, the Secretary expressed his understanding that Israel would like an elaboration of the President’s statement to the effect that we had no reason to believe that Israeli ships would be barred from the Suez Canal if Israel was not itself exercising belligerent rights. The Secretary said this was based upon Egypt’s acceptance of the six principles for a settlement of the Canal dispute. For our part, we believed that Israeli shipping should pass through the Suez and had no objection to stating this.

The Ambassador inquired whether the President might have had any basis for his statement other than “ascribing virtue unless there is reason not to ascribe virtue”. The Secretary replied that he did not want to say more than if the problem of the Gulf of Aqaba were solved, there appeared to be no incentive for Egypt to get into an international controversy regarding Suez. Our estimate of the situation was based on something more than a broad assumption that everyone would do right.

The Ambassador said he would like to discuss procedure. He would propose that he write the Department asking for elucidation of our Aide-Mémoire of February 11, including only those points which the Secretary had said would not cause trouble. He then proposed to arrange to see the Secretary General, since many aspects of the arrangements to be made concerned matters within his competence. This, the Ambassador said, raised the question of the General Assembly discussion the following day. Continuation of the debate and discussion of sanctions obviously would be unconstructive. He inquired whether the Secretary had any advice concerning a postponement of the debate for a few days while we were working on the matter.

The Secretary responded that we would have to move fast. We had encountered considerable difficulty in holding off the debate as long as we had. Assuming that the Ambassador had adequate authority, he saw no reason why the memorandum requesting elucidation of the American position could not be prepared that night, and we would be prepared to work overnight on the reply. He thought it important that the Ambassador place himself in a position to talk to the Secretary General the following day. Perhaps if progress could be made a statement could be issued which would justify a further delay in the debate. He thought it would be necessary, however, to say something of real substance.

The Ambassador wondered if there could be an agreed statement to the press that substantial progress toward an understanding had been made. He doubted that much of a delay in the General Assembly would be needed, although time should be provided for the matter to be considered by the Israeli cabinet which would have to render another decision. After discussing the problems involved in a postponement at the General Assembly it was understood that the Ambassador would talk to Mr. Hammarskjold and endeavor himself to make appropriate arrangements.

The Secretary said that Mr. Hammarskjold might be told that, insofar as the Gulf of Aqaba was concerned, it seemed that arrangements could be worked out within the four corners of existing General Assembly resolutions and what the United States unilaterally had said. Regarding Gaza, the Ambassador would have to talk it over with Mr. Hammarskjold, but what he had said today seemed reasonably consistent with what the Secretary General had said on February 22. He hoped that the results of talking with the Secretary General would be such that Mr. Hammarskjold could join in requesting a postponement of from 24 to 48 hours. The Secretary observed again that we had to be careful not to make it appear that the United States Government was usurping the functions of the Secretary General or the United Nations.

At this point the Secretary and his colleagues left Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah so that the Israeli representatives could consider the type of joint press statement which they would propose be made following the meeting. After reconvening, the draft was considered and revised by agreement between the Secretary and Mr. Eban. While the statement was being typed,⁷ the status of arrangements for the Suez Canal was discussed. Responding to the Ambassador’s question, the Secretary said that not much progress was being made either physically or diplomatically. It appeared obvious that Egypt was trying to slow up completion of the Canal clearance in the belief that that would influence the discussions which we were having. There was submitted to the Egyptian Government a 4-power suggestion on how tolls might be handled,⁸ but we had not learned of the Egyptian reaction. The Ambassador commented that he had heard that Egypt had at first agreed to the proposals and had then receded, much in the same manner as they had done in the case of the Secretary General’s February 22 statement on Gaza.

The Secretary observed that the movement of oil to Europe was increasing. The Texas Railway Commission had just authorized an increase of 200,000 barrels a day in domestic production. With the unusually warm weather in Europe, the situation there had greatly improved. Thus, the urgency for clearance of the Canal was not as great as it might have been.

Reverting to the question of Gaza, the Secretary emphasized again the hope that Israel was in search of substance and was not unduly concerned with form. He knew that Mr. Ben Gurion would like to say to his people that he had been able to get the Egyptians out of Gaza. The Secretary did not think that would be possible. He hoped that the Prime Minister would be aware that Egypt could not accept the claim that they had been put out. It was clear that the United Nations could not force Egypt to give up its rights under the Armistice Agreement, any more than Israel would agree that the United Nations could usurp its rights under that Agreement.

After further discussion on procedures, it was understood that Ambassador Eban would go to New York the following day and that the Israeli draft document requesting elucidation of the United States Aide-Mémoire would not be submitted until the following day.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–2457. Secret. Drafted by Rountree. The Department of State transmitted a summary of the conversation to the Embassy in Tel Aviv in telegram 825, February 26. (Ibid., 674.84A/2–2657)

   On February 25, Shiloah handed Rountree a copy of an Israeli working paper which summarized Eban’s queries and Dulles’ response made during this conversation; see Document 146. A copy of the Israeli working paper, which is unsigned and undated, is in Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 229, Political Affairs & Relations 1957, POL 27 Military operations, Israel Withdrawal Sanctions.

2. Reference is presumably to Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States (3 vols.; 2d rev. ed.; Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1945).
3. During this break in the conversation, at 4:35 p.m. Dulles telephoned Lodge in New York. According to the memorandum of telephone conversation by Proctor, “The Sec. told L. to have Hammarskjold alerted that he, L., would want to talk with him this evening. The Sec said he would call L. back as soon as the meeting with Eban was ended to report to him so that he could report to Hammarskjold. The Sec. said Eban had just finished his presentation and we were talking among ourselves. The Sec. said it looked pretty encouraging. L. said They may get out? The Sec. said Yes. That is a simplification, they want certain things, but the Sec. said he felt it was all taken care of by the Aide-Mémoire.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)
4. A handwritten inscription on an extract from this memorandum of conversation (Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 229, Political Affairs & Relations 1957) identifies the International Law Commission’s Report as U.N. doc. A/3159, which is the Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Eighth Session (23 April–4 July 1956). According to the report, “Passage is innocent so long as the ship does not use the territorial sea for committing any acts prejudicial to the security of the coastal State or contrary to the present rules, or to other rules of international law.”
5. Reference is to the Secretary-General’s report of February 8 on arrangements concerning the status of the U.N. Emergency Force in Egypt. (U.N. doc. A/3526) The General Assembly noted its approval of the report in Resolution 1126 (XI) at its 659th meeting on February 22.
6. See Document 137.
7. For text of the agreed statement, see Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1957, p. 394.
8. The text of the four-power proposal was transmitted in Gadel 146, Document 114.