Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

358. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Ambassador (Makins) and the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur), Department of State, Washington, May 23, 1956¹

Washington , May 23, 1956

SUBJECT

• Operation Stockpile

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur, C
• Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE

Mr. MacArthur said that when the Secretary was in Paris for the NATO meeting during the first week of May he had had a talk with Selwyn Lloyd regarding Operation Stockpile.² Mr. MacArthur stressed that this operation was in secret and was being very closely held within the United States Government. He recalled that President Eisenhower on April 9 had issued a statement regarding the Near East, in which he had said the United States would give support to a victim of aggression in that area.³ It was thought that the statement in itself might exercise a deterrent effect on possible hostilities in the area. Meanwhile, it was necessary for the United States to be prepared to implement the President’s statement, and studies were now under way within the United States Government on how such implementation might take place.

Operation Stockpile was, in effect, two different stockpiles. The first stockpile related to Israel. Only the United States was involved. In the event that Israel was the victim of aggression, the United States would support it by flying planes from operational units in Europe. The operation envisions 24 F–86’s which would be turned over to Israeli pilots on Cyprus. Mr. MacArthur stressed that U.S. planning was on a contingency basis only. It was very closely held. He asked Sir Roger whether the British would agree that the planes could be transferred to Israeli pilots on Cyprus. Selwyn Lloyd had reacted favorably on first hearing of this matter from the Secretary, but later had suggested that it be discussed with Sir Roger in Washington who would give the final word. Mr. MacArthur noted that if the Israelis currently received Canadian F–86’s they would be trained to fly American F–86’s.

The second stockpile related to the Arab States who might be victims of aggression in the event of hostilities. The United States was assembling defensive land weapons, including guns, recoilless rifles and other items and plans to store them on a vessel attached to the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Sir Roger said he had had some intimation of the question, but was not acquainted with the details. He did not think the capacity of the Airfield on Cyprus would accommodate a squadron of F–86’s. Mr. MacArthur explained it was not intended that a squadron would be stationed there but that, if it were decided to supply Israel with U.S. F–86’s, they would be turned over to Israeli pilots there. Sir Roger said he would be in touch with Mr. MacArthur again regarding the question.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Wilkins.
2. See Documents 330 and 334.
3. See footnote 2, Document 258.