185. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of
State1
Washington,August 9,
1955.
SUBJECT
- Alpha: Comments from the Field
Discussion:
Attached for your information is a summary of the comments from the
Chiefs of Mission at Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv,
and Paris on the proposed Alpha statement and tactics (Tab A).
The comments were submitted in response to a letter dated July 22 from
Mr.Francis Russell,
requesting their views on five specific points (Tab
B).2 The statement on tactics to which
the comments refer is attached (Tab C),3 as is the draft of
your statement (Tab D)4 which was sent to the
field.
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Mr.Russell is returning to the
Department on August 10 and we have arranged a meeting with you for
Friday, August 12 at 2:30 p.m. to discuss the entire matter, at which
time both Mr.Russell and I would
like to present our views.
Tab A
COMMENTS ON ALPHA FROM CHIEFS OF MISSION AT AMMAN, BAGHDAD,
BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS5
I. Tactics
The interested governments should be informed of the proposed
statement about 24 hours in advance by the American Chiefs of
Mission. After the UK supporting
statement is issued, the UK Chief of
Mission should make an appropriate approach. In both cases, stress
should be placed upon the desirability of studying the statement,
exercising restraint, and not taking an immediate position.
Ambassador Dillon strongly
recommends that in order to avoid adverse effects on over-all
US-French relations, the French be provided two weeks’ advance
notice and, in general, be made to feel we consider them in the same
category as the UK. Ambassador
Heath suggests we may
wish to approach the USSR in
advance.
II. Response on Parr of
Governments and Public
The Governments of Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan at best will probably be
cautious in their response and refrain from taking a definite
position until after Arab consultations. Unfavorable reactions on
the part of Egypt and Syria are foreseen. In all cases, the Arab
public probably will immediately reject the proposals. Ambassador
Gallman is less apprehensive than the British over the effect of the
statement in Iraq. Ambassador Lawson expects outright and vigorous opposition on
the part of both the Israel Government and public.
III. Special Security
Precautions
Our missions anticipate that demonstrations may occur but believe
that they can be handled by the local authorities.
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IV. Publicity
No publicity before the statement is advocated. Authentic texts in
Arabic, French and English, together with explanatory material,
should be on hand for immediate distribution afterwards. We should
be prepared to use all information media to explain the statement
and refute distortions. Ambassador Gallman advises having ready a
statement rebutting the contention that the proposal is a planned
follow-up of the Turko-Iraqi Pact.
V. Presence in Countries of Chiefs
of Mission and Heads of Government
All of our Chiefs of Mission plan to be at their posts in September.
With the possible exception of Prime Minister Nuri, who may visit
Turkey from September 10 to 15, the heads of government are expected
to be at home.
VI. Comments on Text of
Statement
Few comments were received from the Arab states on the text of the
statement. There was a consensus, however, that reference to
repatriation of a portion of the refugees should be included.
Ambassador Lawson strongly
urged that the statement be generalized and confined to an analysis
of the problem and outline of the principles in accordance with
which it might be solved. If this is not possible, he believes we
should specify the concessions to be made by the Arab states as well
as those expected from Israel. He notes that the draft British
supporting statement confines itself to an analysis of the problem
and to general principles. (Note: The revised August 4, 1955 draft
of your statement is considerably more general than the text sent to
the field.)6
VII Johnston Mission
The Chiefs of Mission believe the statement would have an adverse
effect upon the Johnston
negotiations.
