Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

204. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, January 7, 1956—9 a.m.

294. Deptels 298,² 300³ and 316.⁴ Hejaz Railway Survey Contract.⁵ I have given this matter closest attention since sending Embtel 273, December 21⁶ but only last night received secret word from King Saud: “Tell the Ambassador he can be sure this contract will not be given to the Poles”.

On December 27 after receiving from Prince Faisal King’s message re Buraimi (Embtel 282⁷) I said reports that King had approved commission’s recommendation troubled me greatly; it seemed obvious Polish bid was Communist political move, and only last month King had told Ambassador Cooper “we will not permit one Communist in Saudi Arabia” (Delhi Embtel 1079 to Department⁸).

At first Faisal was evasive, arguing that commission, set up by three governments, had but abided by terms of reference and it was not for one government to question decisions. Why, he asked, do you not bid lower? I said we do not subsidize private enterprise and again asked if King had approved. He asked why was I troubled? I said because I feared reaction in Washington would be most unfavorable, and I was trying my best with His Majesty and with him to lay sound foundation for future Saudi–American relations.

After further [sic] to my unsatisfactory discussion, he admitted Commission’s recommendation had been “told to King who had raised no objection.” I urged reconsideration, stressing incongruity that Communists, recognized enemies of Islam, should be selected by Moslems even to survey reconstruction of their famous pilgrim railway leading to their sacred shrines. His reply was noncommittal but he seemed agree that Yusuf Yasin, who was present throughout and would shortly return Riyadh, should inform King of my views.

I had to be content with this but, … decided appeal to King. Fortunately Faisal left Jidda on hunting trip so I could not be accused of going behind his back.

Abdullah Balkhair, King’s private secretary, was arriving Jidda early following week…. He agreed write King … letter giving my views and sent it by trusted messenger.

Letter stressed unfavorable Washington reaction and suggested this [garble] even militant against Saudi interest in Buraimi dispute… .

King said he wished not only assure me Polish contract would not be approved but also send personal message to USG re Buraimi and other important matters. I will report these as soon as [name deleted] finishes writing up his notes.⁹

Re Polish contract King said that after phoning Abdullah he had sent personal letter to “our friend Shukri Quwatli” repeating arguments in Abdullah’s letter. … He said he had in fact not taken exception to Poles “working in desert under surveillance” but on reading those arguments he decided at once Poles must not have contract.

. . . . . . .

King closed subject by saying in substance, “this action is right but I want it to be taken also as new proof of my desire to continue to cooperate with the United States.” This was also major theme of message for USG… .

Wadsworth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 986A.712/1–756. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, and London.
2. Telegram 298, December 22, sent to Jidda for information, was repeated as 469 to Damascus and 277 to Amman of the same date. These telegrams requested the posts to comment on the prospect that the Polish bid for the survey of the Hijaz Railroad would be accepted. The Department also requested information on the possibility that Syria was seeking to offset its debts to Saudi Arabia by financing the project through the Syrian–Polish trade agreement. The Department also solicited suggestions on the prospects of blocking the Polish bid. (Ibid., 986A.712/12–2055)
3. In telegram 300, December 23, the Department requested the Embassy in Jidda to provide information on when the Saudis were expected to make their decision on the submitted bids. The Department also inquired what measures the Embassy could take to point out “hidden motives” in the Polish offer. (Ibid., 986A.712/12–2355)
4. In telegram 316, January 4, 1956, the Department requested Jidda’s views on telegram 304 from Amman, December 27, not printed. In it, the Embassy in Amman reported that according to the senior Jordanian member of the executive committee, the Polish bid would not be accepted. (Ibid., 986A.712/12–2755)
5. During the 1950’s the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan initiated plans for the reconstruction and repair of the Hijaz Railway, linking Damascus and Medina. In December 1955, the Executive Committee for the Recommissioning of the Hijaz Railroad, a trinational group of representatives from each country, opened bids for a proposed engineering survey of the railroad. Documentation on the Hijaz Railroad is ibid., Central File 786A.712.
6. In telegram 273 the Embassy reported that the lowest bid for the survey contract was submitted by a Polish firm, CEKOP, of Warsaw. The Embassy added that the Executive Committee on Reconstruction was reportedly recommending that the Polish bid be accepted despite its awareness that the bid was far below the estimated survey costs and that it was “obviously based on Soviet desire penetrate area.” (Ibid., 986A.712/12–2055)
7. See footnote 3, Document 198.
8. In telegram 1079, December 1, 1955, Ambassador John S. Cooper transmitted the highlights of his November 29 audience with Saud. The King talked at length about relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and about the Arab–Israeli issue. (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.56/12–155)
9. On January 10, 1956, Wadsworth conveyed Saud’s secret message as reconstructed from the Embassy interpreter’s notes. Among other topics, Saud informed the Ambassador that he had decided to postpone taking action on Buraimi until after the Eden–Eisenhower talks. The King later added that he would take no action on the offer of Russian arms or on Buraimi until he had received a “final reply” from the United States. The King’s message also touched on the Dhahran Airfield, jet aircraft for Saudi Arabia, and the Baghdad Pact. (Telegram 299 from Jidda; ibid., 986A.712/ 1–1056)