Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

409. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State ¹

Washington , October 12, 1957 .

SUBJECT

• U.S. Aid for Iran: Qom Airfield

Discussion

The Shah of Iran expects far more military aid from us than we can give him. Recent events in the Middle East have intensified the pressure which he has exerted upon our Ambassador and the Chief of our military mission in Iran. An Iranian general recently submitted a list of requirements to the Defense Department which would cost between $300 and $500 million. The Shah has talked in terms of 2,000 jet aircraft, weapons with atomic capability and a greatly enlarged navy. The total military aid of $40 million which is programmed for Iran in FY 1958, $20 million of which is earmarked for military construction, will fall far short of the Shah’s expectations and his disappointment may shake his confidence in United States support for Iran in her exposed position. While the Shah is grateful for U.S. assurances of support, as expressed to you recently through the Foreign Minister (Tab A),² he believes that he must be in a position to demonstrate to his people the material advantages, in a military sense, to be derived from association with the West. He is fully aware of the latest opposition in his country to Iran’s present foreign policy alignment as contrasted to Iran’s previous policy of neutralism.

To maintain the Shah’s confidence we should do more than we are now planning to do. In the category of military equipment we cannot possibly satisfy his demands. As the result of recent consultations in Washington, the Chief of our military mission informed the Shah that we have now added to what was previously programmed for Iran, i.e., recoilless weapons, howitzers and M–47 tanks (Tab B)³ without much reaction from him one way or another. It seems clear that this step will not assuage the Shah’s present frustration and disappointment.

In this same conversation the Shah again urged U.S. support for a project which has become one of his most cherished desires; the construction of a modern jet airfield at Qom, 80 miles southwest of Tehran. While the Department of Defense has informed us that the Qom field has low military priority, the political, economic and prestige arguments for this airport are strong. Qom is close enough to Tehran to make a jet airfield there appear important to the defense of the capital and thus contribute to the morale of the government and the people. Also, Qom is a city that may have a great economic future because it is in an area where large oil deposits have been found. Next, the jet airfield at Qom can help to relieve the heavy pressure on the field in Tehran, where the present operations of jet aircraft are held to endanger commercial traffic. Both because of its practical usefulness and because of its value as a symbol of our close support, we believe this project will bolster the Shah’s confidence and strengthen his ties with the West.

Assuming that our policy interests in Iran require U.S. support for the Qom airfield, the funding of this project becomes the paramount question. The project would cost about $6.5 million for essential facilities, e.g. tower, fuel storage and a landing strip. A fully equipped field, which the Shah might well request at some future date, would cost in the neighborhood of $16 million or more. In a recent meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,⁴ Mr. Murphy raised the question of Qom and the funding thereof. General Twining, replying for the JCS, stated that the field might prove useful, but the Chiefs could not give it a sufficiently high military priority to justify the use of MAP funds. The Chiefs agreed, however, to assist the Department in any effort to procure funds from another source.

The only other source of funds for such a project would be from appropriations for special assistance. You will recall that you have approved programs which will lead to the obligation of all but $100.45 million of the funds available for nonmilitary purposes. Against this availability we now show “potential” requirements amounting to slightly over $300 million, including such items as any assistance that might be given to Iceland and Poland and any supplemental assistance necessary in the Middle East or for countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Vietnam, and Korea. Approval of this proposal to finance Qom would reduce this contingency reserve to $94 million.

Recommendation:

That you authorize Mr. Dillon to request ICA to undertake the financing of construction of the Qom airfield in FY 1958 with up to $6.5 million from special assistance funds.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/10–1257. Secret. Drafted by Mouser and Williams and cleared by Murphy, Dillon, and Barnes.
2. Tab A, not attached, is printed supra .
3. Tab B, telegram ARCG 86392, 05115Z (Army Message), from CHARMISH–MAAG Tehran to Defense, repeated to the Department of State, October 5, not attached, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/10–557)
4. As reported in the memorandum on the substance of discussion at the State–JCS meeting, October 4. (Ibid., State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)
5. Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendation.