404. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Ambassador in Iran (Chapin)1

Dear Mr. Ambassador: Your recent telegrams (288 and 290)2 regarding Iranian attitudes toward the British position in the Persian Gulf and the bordering shiekhdoms, including Muscat and Oman, have coincided with a formal British approach to the Department on the question of Bahrein (Deptel 351).3 From here it appears that the Iranians see the present British difficulties as a possible avenue to the acquisition of Bahrein. In view of the visits of the rulers of Kuwait and Dubai and the forthcoming visit of the sheikh of Qatar, the Iranians, in addition, are probably contemplating a general enhancement of Iranian prestige and influence in the Persian Gulf. Tied directly to this problem are, of course, Iranian aspirations toward the potentially oil-bearing waters of the Gulf.

It would be a mistake, as we see it, for Iran to muddy the waters further. The Iranians must realize that not only would it be resented by the British but Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries would also be opposed to any Iranian ventures into this area. While we plan to have bilateral talks with the British on the subject of the Persian Gulf sea bed in Washington in September and November of this year, we do not feel that this is a subject that we can profitably discuss with Iran at this time.

It is our feeling consequently, that any further approaches from the Iranians regarding a possible U.S. re-examination of its policy in the Persian Gulf should be met by a tactful restatement of our present position, i.e., territorial disputes in the area are properly a matter for negotiation among the parties concerned and that barring the development of a mutually acceptable modus vivendi, or a recognized international understanding, the United States in its relations in the area will continue to be governed by recognition of the status quo. In light of the foregoing it would, of course, be inappropriate for us to take the [Page 940] initiative in raising this subject, except in the case of Bahrein, and then only in accordance with the instruction of July 25, 1956 (CA–769).4 In this connection, I am enclosing for your information copies of the aide-mémoires recently exchanged with the British Embassy here.5

We were glad to see Fraser Wilkins and Charlie Stelle get on their way this week. You have been faced with some unusual personnel turnover problems this summer and I hope that the arrival of these two other officers will round out your staff to your entire satisfaction.

Sincerely yours,

BILL
  1. Source: Department of State, Tehran Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 43, 322.1 Bahrein Dispute. Secret; Official-Informal.
  2. Both dated August 12, neither printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 641.86E/8–1257 and 786E.00/8–1257)
  3. In telegram 351, August 19, the Department informed the Embassy in Tehran of a British aide-mémoire of July 31 requesting U.S. support in calming potential Iranian public agitation against Great Britain over conflicting claims to Bahrein. The United States replied in an aide-mémoire of August 16 that the Embassy in Tehran had discretionary authorization to advise the Iranians to consider carefully the consequences of pressing Iran’s claim to Bahrein or stimulating popular agitation over the issue. (Ibid., 746D.022/8–1957)
  4. In this instruction, the Department gave the Embassy discretionary authorization to approach the Iranian Government over its claims to Bahrein as described in footnote 3 above. (Ibid., 746D.022/7–2556)
  5. Attached but not printed; see footnote 3 above.