Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

762.0221/6–1753: Telegram

No. 198
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State¹

secret

London, June 17, 1953—6 p.m.

6623. Blankenhorn had a long meeting with Roberts 15th and brief formal meeting with Selwyn Lloyd following day.

He brought message that Adenauer believes a dangerous situation now exists in Germany as result of international developments, that he is worried about election prospects, and also about the general situation in Europe. Adenauer asks for help on two points. First, that after Bermuda a statement should be issued giving “a new Anglo-US lead to Europe” and specifically reaffirming the points made in the West powers note of September 23, 1952,² which were also covered in Adenauer’s Bundestag speech of June 10. In order to give statement appropriate conciliatory tone, Adenauer proposed that it should make the point that since the EDC limits the German armed forces, its effect will be to provide real security for all Germany’s neighbors including Soviet Union. Second, he renewed the request that HICOMers be given rank of Ambassador.

During discussion Blankenhorn said that Germany had made three points to US which for present should be withheld from French. First, they had proposed as an item in ultimate settlement that refugees should have the right to return to their homes under decent conditions (Heimatsrechte) even where under foreign rule. Second, the problem of the Oder-Neisse line, which no German Government could accept, should be by-passed by a “European solution” under some form of international control, which, for example, would not mean ejecting the Poles from areas involved. Third point was putting EDC in new light as indicated above.

Blankenhorn also stated during the conversation that Adenauer was opposed to the idea of secret informal talks with the Russians among a small group as envisaged by Churchill,³ since experience showed that they almost always worked out to the Soviet advantage. As to proposal for German observer at four power talks Blankenhorn made it clear that Germans did not expect observer could sit in on talks but only wanted him to be present at place where talks were held, provided it was not behind Iron Curtain. German proposal for US–UK–French-German conference “at State Secretary level” before Bermuda was also discussed and Blankenhorn finally appeared to accept Roberts view that it would not be wise or necessary as work could be done by HICOMers.

Roberts replies were generally sympathetic but non-committal as to details, except that he affirmed the wish of the British to give all possible help to Adenauer and pointed out that the British had already expressed favorable opinion about the proposal for giving HICOMers rank of Ambassador. But he thought and Blankenhorn agreed that it would hurt Adenauer if French did not go along and suggested that British work on French to this end. Roberts expressed doubts, however, about the idea of a post-Bermuda statement on grounds that it might prejudice four-power talks, but agreed to consider appropriate way to reaffirm west support of points contained in September 23 note with special emphasis on contractuals and EDC.

Aldrich

1. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, and Moscow.
2. Document 138.
3. See footnote 3, Document 186.