Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, with the Annual Message of the President, December 6, 1875, Volume I

No. 245.
Mr. Davis to Mr. Fish.

United States Legation,
Berlin, May 10, 1875. (Received May 27.)

No. 113.]

Sir: The bill for the suppression of Catholic monasteries is still pending before the Prussian Diet. It is contested at every step by the Roman Catholic members, and is made the subject of acrimonious debate, but it will undoubtedly pass by a large majority. It will be followed by a bill respecting the legal status of Old Catholics, of which I shall send you a copy by this mail, if possible; if not, by the next. This bill will give to the Old Catholics a right to share in the use of the Roman Catholic churches and cemeteries.

When the Old Catholics are in a majority, they will be assigned the chief church, if there be more than one church in the municipality; and when churches are used in common, they will have the right of selecting the time when they will occupy them. Provisions are made as to the selection of clergymen, and as to the division of revenues. This legislation follows in the track of Switzerland, where similar rights have been given to the Old Catholics. There the Romanists have refused to use the churches which have been, as they conceive, desecrated by the services of the Old Catholics. Should the same course be followed here, it would result in the abandonment of many churches to the Old Catholics.

The liberals of Germany are determined to carry on the contest with the Latin church, which they regard as an enemy of free thought and free government. By compelling it to educate its clergy under the supervision of the state, to submit the selection of its bishops to the supervision of the civil power, to admit the laity to a voice in the selection of the parochial clergy, to account to the state for the use of its eleemosynary funds, to abandon the hoarding of wealth for the use of the clergy in monastic institutions, to share its churches, its cemeteries, its properties, and its revenues with persons of the Catholic faith who do not accept the doctrine of papal infallibility, they expect to cripple it as a political engine of reaction.

The liberals of Italy also manifest uneasiness at the relations between their government and the papacy.

The inability of the Emperor of Germany to make his lately proposed visit to the King of Italy was a great disappointment to the liberals, both of Italy and of Germany. It was hoped that a personal interview between the two m on arch s would harmonize the policies of the two powers against what are regarded as the aggressive pretensions of the papacy. In the sitting of the house of deputies at Rome, ten days since, the ministry was questioned respecting the relations between the church and the state. They were reminded of the guarantees, they were told that the clergy were violating the laws with impunity, and they were asked why a bill had not been brought in respecting the administration of ecclesiastical property. In their reply, the ministry denied that the clergy were violating the laws, but promised to bring in a bill for the administration of ecclesiastical property, which should protect the just rights of the laity; and they acknowledged that there is a conflict between the liberals and the church, and that the nation should avail itself of the means offered by its traditions and its laws for the protection of its interests. The discussion was renewed the following week, and, so far as we know by the telegrams, is not yet closed. Many allusions were made to Mr. Gladstone’s pamphlets upon the relations of the Vatican to the state, and, judging from the meager accounts over the wires, the greatest interest was manifested in the subject.

There are also signs that France, taken up as Frenchmen are with the reconstruction of their political system, does not pass by the question which agitates Europe. An article in the last number of the Révue des Deux Mondes closes with these words: “Après avoir représenté la politique de la résistance, cet homme extraordinaire, [Prince Bismarck,] qui avait en lui ‘l’étoffe pour plus d’un rôle, est devenu le tribun de l’Allemagne, et il allume dans les esprits des passions avec lesquelles nous ferons bien de compter. Assurément il nous est permis de blâmer les solutions radieales qu’il propose et d’en patronner cFautres; mais qu’on ne puisse pas nous soupçonner de conspirer secrètement avec sesmis, de vouloir défendre coutre lui l’encyclique et le syllabus—l’enthousiasme qu’il excite devaendrait dufanatisme. Paul Louis Courier écrivait en 1823: Serous-nous Capucins? Ne le serons-nous pas? Voila aujourd’hui la question. ‘Non cette question n’en est pas une, nous ne serous pas Caupcins.’ II y a de notre honneur autaut que de notre surete.”

In my No. 109 I stated that it is believed here that the liberal party in Belgium sympathizes with the German representations respecting the course of the Belgian bishops. The events of the week have given further proof of the correctness of the opinion. On the 4th instant, the recent notes between the two governments were made public, and formed the subject of discussion in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. In presenting the note, Count d’Aspremont Lynden said: “Among the facts of which the German notes treat there is one which raises a particular question of a penal law, namely, the Duchesne affair. We have published nothing about it. You will consider it right that this reserve be maintained until the conclusion of the investigation.”

On the 7th the notes were again discussed. Mr. Frere Orban, while approving the course of the government, censured strongly the attacks of the Catholic press and of the episcopal pastorals upon liberal institutions. Neutrality is not a fortress, he said, in which Belgium could shut itself up and escape from its obligations. He read several newspaper articles and several passages from the pastorals, and he charges that the party to which the writers belonged impelled the country to the verge of civil war and embroiled it with foreign powers. Has the government, he said, fulfilled its duty towards Germany in the Duchesne affair? It can act without fear of being accused of subservience to superior strength.

This religious agitation throughout Europe, this resistance to the pretensions of the Vatican, explain the uneasiness and the uncertainty respecting the preservation of peace. France is arming, it is said, for a war in behalf of the Vatican, a war which is to be not only a war of revenge, but a religious war. Therefore, since war must come, it is better it should come now, while Germany is strong, before France is armed, and before Italy and Austria have been detached from the liberal alliance. The Berlin Military Weekly, a military journal of the highest authority, says:

“It is true that a French infantry regiment will henceforth include eighteen companies, instead of twenty-one as formerly; hut as the twenty-one old companies were intended to supply cadres for three battalions of one thousand men each, while the eighteen new companies will serve as a frame-work for the formation of four battalions of one thousand each, the war strength of the French infantry is by this latest measure increased by one hundred and forty-four thousand men.”

Upon this the influential and half official Cologne Gazette says:

“Our leading generals regard the French armaments as very serious; but though peace is possibly endangered by these military preparations, France can hardly be in a position to make war single-handed, while if she indulges in exaggerated armaments without finding an ally she will only exhaust her resources. Under these circumstances, it is of the utmost importance to know whether France has any chance of finding allies. France has no longer reason to count upon Russia as an ally, but she seems to hope that the Austrian alliance, nipped in the bud in 1870, might be completed in the event of another war more successfully commenced than the last. Fortunately, these hopes are sure to be disappointed as long as Count Andrassy is the leading minister of Austria. But as Austrian politics have lately passed through so many different phases, the German chancellor, no doubt with anxious solicitude, every now and then ponders upon the contingency of the revenge party coming into power in Vienna.”

These ideas found a brutal and exaggerated expression lately in a letter from Paris to the London Times, which was published in that journal under the heading, “A French scare.” The letter was accompanied by a leader in the Times. Both immediately attracted great attention on the continent, especially in Paris, where they were made the subject of extensive notice. The Times again returned to the subject, and in an article on the 8th of May, speaking of the misgivings to which its correspondent had called attention, it said:

“With regard to them our readers will form their own opinion. It would be presumptuou to say that they are wholly without importance.

“The existence of a conviction in a section of German society that war is inevitable,, and that it would be well to anticipate the enemy, must necessarily be a fact of some importance. And if even, as we incline to think, the expressions which disquiet France are uttered rather in bravado and irritation, and do not manifest any fixed purpose, they are still not without significance, since such things become serious by repetition, and many an act of popular infatuation has had its origin in a cry which few quite believed in. But from such a vague sentiment of hostility on the part of a section of the Germans to a settled plot of the German government there is a vast distance. * * Considering the temper of a large part, we believe a majority, of the Russian people, and the suspicions and jealousies of other continental states, it is hardly possible that the German Empire should commit itself to the tremendous enterprise of ruining France, without finding its neighbors gravitate to each other in a hostile league.”

The correctness of this opinion will soon be tested. The Emperor of Russia arrives here to-day, on a visit of three days in Berlin. He is accompanied by Prince Gortchakow.

It can hardly be expected that the great questions which are agitating Europe will not be spoken of when the two Emperors, when the two chancellors meet. I have reason to believe that the Emperor of Russia comes here in the interest of peace, that his opinions will be expressed freely and earnestly, and that he will not hesitate to say that the peace of Europe must be kept.

I have, &c.,

J. C. BANCROFT DAVIS.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 113.—Translation.]

Proceedings in the Belgian Chamber, May 4, 1875.

Inasmuch as the telegraphic report which we published yesterday of the session of May 4 of the Chamber of Representatives was in several respects incomplete, as were likewise the dispatches and declarations communicated to the deputies, we think proper to publish a full report of the same session to-day:

The Speaker. The minister of foreign affairs has the floor.

M. D’ Aspremont-Lynden, (minister of foreign affairs.) Gentlemen, during the session of April 16, I had the honor to inform the chamber that we had received a note from his excellency the minister of Germany, bearing date of the day preceding. I added that we would communicate this document to you, together with the reply of the government of the King.

Our reply was sent on the 30th of April.

(The minister here read a translation of Count Perponcher’s note, which was as follows:)

“Brussels, April15, 1875.

“The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, has received orders to address the following communication to his excellency Count d’Aspremont-Lynden, minister of foreign affairs, in reply to his note of February 26.

“The chancellor of the Emperor regrets that the government of His Majesty the King of the Belgians has thought proper to signify its unwillingness to comply with the request presented in the note of the undersigned of February 3, concerning the desired complement to the existing Belgian laws.

“Although he willingly admits that the royal Belgian government is the best judge of its own parliamentary difficulties, yet, in the present case, difficulties of this kind are not so much concerned as is the question whether the Belgian government can become convinced, as we are, that ail unfortunate state of things exists, which should be remedied.

“In all legislative questions, the first thing to be done is to find out what is really well founded, reasonable, and desirable. In the second place, it is only necessary to examine the difficulties which hamper the execution of what has been recognized as being just, and to consider how these difficulties are to be overcome.

“The question how, in practice, it is proper to fulfill the international obligation which is incumbent upon every state, of preventing its subjects from disturbing the internal peace of neighboring countries, and from impairing friendly international relations, is one which concerns not only the relations between Germany and Belgium, but all states which consider it their duty to use their best efforts for the preservation of the general peace, and for the maintenance of friendly relations with their neighbors.

“Every age has been obliged to settle this question according to the demands of the time and the possibility that existed of preventing the exertion of foreign influences against the security of a given state. In our time, it does not seem that it is still possible, in consideration of existing international requirements, for a state to take its stand, as was formerly done, exclusively upon its own sovereignty and a regard for its own isolated interests.

“The connection of material interests, the facilities of individual relations, and the exchange of ideas have produced, to an extent that was not even dreamed of a generation ago, an intimate and delicate association of all peaceful interests, and no state is secure from the influence of any disturbance of these relations.

“This same development has given facilities and means of action, formerly unknown, to those elements of the population which speculate upon disturbances of public order and peace. These phenomena call for the strengthening rather than-the relaxation of mutual protection, or at least for a considerate regard for peace and public order in neighboring states.

“If the realization of this idea meets with numerous obstacles, these may be discussed and examined in a peaceful exchange of opinions. Nothing that threatens the friendly relations of nations can, in the long run, resist the pressure of public opinion in civilized countries, provided attention be directed to it and kept fixed upon it by continued discussion.

“To the great satisfaction of the imperial government, this has taken place to a great extent, and the continuation of a public discussion of the subject in question will have a constant tendency to correct preconceived opinions and inaccurate interpretations. Even in Germany, the beginning of the discussion has attracted the attention of the-authorities to defects in the laws now in force, similar to those which exist in Belgium, as regards the protection of other states from the schemes of German subjects, although no complaints have yet been made by foreign governments on account of hostile machinations of German citizens, because there has been no interference on the part of German subjects in the internal affairs of other states.

“Nevertheless, the chancellor of the empire lost no time in urging the imperial authorities to examine by what legislative measures the protection of other countries and of the internal peace of neighboring states might be secured against possible disturbances by German subjects. It cannot yet be known how this request will be received in Germany, even by the various legislative powers.

“The undersigned is instructed again to express the hope that the government of His Majesty the King of the Belgians will follow this example, and endeavor to furnish a stronger guarantee of the preservation of the friendly relations to which, according to its repeated assertions, it attaches as high a value as does the German Empire; by making such an endeavor, even should it prove unsuccessful, it will contribute to the enlightenment of public opinion on this subject, and to the establishment of an understanding which interests all states in an equal degree.

“If the Belgian government, in taking this course, reaches a public discussion of the present correspondence, it will certainly eagerly avail itself of this occasion to correct the erroneous ideas which are gaining ground, and according to which Germany is seeking to strike a blow at the liberty of the press in Belgium.

“Germany has, in general, no interference in the internal affairs of Belgium in view; she complains, however, of the interference of Belgian subjects with the internal ecclesiastical policy of Germany, said interference having been occasioned by acts having no connection with the freedom of the press in Belgium. At the same time, the imperial German government still thinks that the exceptional situation in which Belgium is placed, by virtue of the privilege of neutrality, furnishes ground for expecting that country to exercise particular care in everything that concerns its international obligations, and particularly toward the powers which guarantee that neutrality.

“Taking this view of the case, the imperial, government has deemed it its duty to bring about an exchange of ideas with the Belgian government, bringing the same to the notice of the other guaranteeing powers. The Belgian government will certainly gladly infer from this that the complaints of Germany have no object in view which is in anywise calculated to alarm the guaranteeing powers.

“The undersigned, &c.,

“PERPONCHER.”

The following is our reply to Count Perponcher:

“The undersigned, minister of foreign affairs of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, has the honor to reply to the note which his excellency the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, was pleased to address to him on the 15th instant.

“The chancellor of the empire has seen with regret that the government of the King declines to accede to the requests presented in the German note of February 3.

“The undersigned thinks he may remark that this conclusion goes beyond the terms of his first reply. The government of the King declares that if any powers should modify the penal common law, so as to make a mere intention or a non-accepted proposal a crime, it would examine this problem of penal law, and would probably follow the movement.

“The preliminary proceedings in the case of Duchesne (which was referred to a competent court, and which will be decided as speedily as possible) are not yet at an end, and the undersigned does not hesitate to renew the assurance which he gave in his note of February 26.

“The cabinet of Berlin, taking a more general stand-point, desires the government of the King to examine how each state is to fulfill, in practice, the obligation which is incumbent upon it to prevent its subjects from disturbing the internal peace of neighboring countries, and from impairing friendly international relations. This question applies not only to the relations between Belgium and Germany, but it concerns all nations that consider it their duty to watch for the preservation of the common peace. Inasmuch as the laws of Germany have the same defects that the chancellor points out in those of Belgium, that officer has requested the imperial authorities to supply said defects, although he is as yet unable to form an estimate of the manner in which this measure will be received by the different legislative branches of the German government, and, while he urges Belgium to follow this example, he expresses a desire to see an understanding established that may interest all countries in an equal degree.

“When the government of the King shall have been informed concerning the measures which shall have been adopted in Germany and elsewhere for the purpose of bringing about these changes in the universal system of legislation, it will examine said measures, both in their relations to the customs and traditions of Belgium and to the liberties guaranteed by its constitution, and it will perform this task with the most sincere desire to contribute to the maintenance of friendly international relations.

“The undersigned hastened, in accordance with the desire expressed by the chancellor, to inform the legislature of the reception of the note of April 15, relative to the freedom of the press.

“Belgium is fully determined to fulfill her duties as a neutral state in a friendly spirit, and to the full extent required by international law.

“The government of the King, it is hardly necessary to say, has never doubted the uprightness of the intentions of the Berlin cabinet in making the communications which it has made to the other powers which guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The undersigned, on his part, would not be the organ of the sentiments of his country if he did not again give assurance of the high value which Belgium attaches to the excellent relations which she has always maintained with Germany, and of her sincere desire to do all in her power to insure a continuance of the same.

“The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer to his excellency the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, the assurances of his high consideration.

“COUNT D’ASPREMONT-LYNDEN.

“Brussels, April 30, 1875.”

You will recollect, adds the minister of foreign affairs, that the Belgian note of February 28 mentioned an exposé which retraced the various phases of the Duchesne affair. If that document has not been read to you, and if we have not had it inserted in the parliamentary annals, it has been exclusively on account of the existence and in the interest of the judicial proceedings which are now being held.

Gentlemen, when I promised, during the session of April 13, to reply to the interpellation addressed to the government, we had only received the notes of February 3 and 26, and my explanations would necessarily have had only those two diplomatic communications in view. Since then, further communications having been exchanged between the cabinet of Brussels and that of Berlin, it is proper that these should he considered in taking a view of the situation.

Among the matters referred to by the German notes, there is one which gives rise to a particular question of penal law; it is that which relates to Duchesne.

In addition to the details of the notes already known, we have published nothing concerning the period previous to the month of February last. It will doubtless seem proper to you that this secrecy should be observed until the termination of the judicial proceedings which are now being held. Whatever may be their result, we shall faithfully shape our conduct according to the declarations which we have made more than once to the cabinet of Berlin.

The other matters now belong to a more general question, set forth in the note of April 15. The minister of Germany, as you have seen, has laid much stress upon the interest which the various states, particularly at the present day, have in preventing their subjects from disturbing the internal peace of neighboring countries and from impairing friendly international relations.

The nature of these new measures is not indicated, and the manner in which the proposed changes will be received by the legislative authorities, cannot be known as yet We think, therefore, that we have done what the situation demanded in declaring that we would examine the measures which should be adopted in Germany and elsewhere, both in their relations to the customs and traditions of Belgium and to the liberties guaranteed by its constitution, and that we should be guided in that examination by the most sincere desire to contribute to the maintenance of friendly relations among the various nations.

The diplomatic documents are now known to you. I have stated what are the questions therein comprised, and what is the present situation of those questions.

In confidently communicating to the chamber and to the country the language used by us and the disposition which we have manifested, we once more urgently appeal to the patriotism of all. We believe that we have been the faithful interpreters of the thoughts and feelings’ of Belgium. These feelings, we hope, will be properly appreciated in Germany.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 113.]

A FRENCH SCARE.

Paris, May 4.

[From the London Times of May 6, 1875.]

The French press is silent; the German press is chanting the blessings of peace. The Berlin Post, which launched across the world the first warlike thunder-clap, draws back and regrets the sensation produced by its peal. The other German papers criticise the unseasonable violence of their confrère; and, after having reprinted his article, without comment, bitterly reproach him with it. The diplomatic world is full of confidence. Princes and Emperors are traveling, taking the waters, or proposing to take them. Politically speaking, the contrast which exists between the peace which is being chanted to-day, and the war, the phantom of which was called up yesterday, reminds one of the opening scenes of Göthe’s Hermann mid Dorothea. Politics are an idyl, and people are embracing in a fraternal transport.

I had reason, therefore, for astonishment two evenings ago in a political salon on one of the leading representatives of foreign politics in France asking me, “Can you explain how this happens? I have been to the races; I there saw twenty persons, belonging to various circles, all in a position to reflect and judge, and I found them in the greatest anxiety as to the near future.” This uneasiness which my friend remarked upon, which is the consequence neither of the Belgian note nor of the recent alarm in the press, which is now being propagated in high places before penetrating below, which people seek to dissemble without succeeding in hiding, exists in a persistent, oppressive, painful form. The most serious minds believe in an impending danger, in a latent menace, in that vague and terrible sensation which is expressed in the words “there is something brewing.” It is already some time since this sensation has been haunting the best-regulated minds. People thought to get rid of it by holding their tongues; I thought so too, but I am now forced to a different conclusion. These things are circulating in the dark, and cutting out for themselves an irresistible path in people’s imaginations. The best way is to bring them to the light of day, to seek their causes and show their consequences. If they are false, daylight will dissipate them; if they are true, it is better they should emerge from obscurity.

Well, the fact is that politicians coming from abroad, as well as those at home who claim to be well informed, assert that peace or war is about to depend on the interview of the German and Russian Emperors. It is said, and this no one can or does deny, that there exists in Germany a powerful party, comprising the whole military element, which thinks Germany concluded a had treaty; that the famous five milliards—that monstrous sum the extortion of which even in the eyes of Bismarck himself was to ruin France—have already returned into its coffers; that Belfort is, as it were, a thorn which enters the flesh of Germany; that military France is re-organizing itself, not rapidly enough to become immediately dangerous, hut rapidly enough to furnish before long a formidable army to an alliance with other nations. They add that Germany is not richer than before the war, that her industry, her commerce, her finances, her social organization cannot long support her present armaments, and that she cannot, at the risk of exhaustion, undertake to defend for fifty years the conquests she made in six months; that if, on the other hand, she disarms in order to avoid ruining herself, France will be re-armed with threatening promptitude, and that the dilemma thus arises either of destroying herself in order to preserve herself, or of delivering herself up to the enemy by ceasing to remain arms in hand. They add also, and from their point of view—the point of view of their German fatherland—it is impossible to question or deny it—they add that never was there a more propitious moment than the present for securing Germany a long term of prosperity, a long era of peace. This is how they reason, and this reasoning explains both the rumors of a fortnight ago and the present silence.

The recent note addressed to Belgium, communicated to the powers, and permeating public opinion, has proved that at this moment Germany is free to do as she likes. England, the guarantor of Belgian neutrality, will not have Belgium touched. That is the limit of its resolutions, and its policy does not bind it to any other reservations. Belgium will not be touched, and England will remain quiet. Italy is behind the Alps: she is now the competitor for the religious influence of France. She did not listen fo Herr von Keudell, it is true, but it was not in order to defend the greatness of France, from whom the papal question has for a long time estranged her. Italy will do nothing. Sign or Visconti Venosta, moreover, has said Italy has as much need of peace as of bread. It is not Austria which thinks itself threatened, for her policy consists in guessing and anticipating the desires of her neighbor. It is not Austria which will offer any obstacle. She will do nothing. One power only is embarrassing, and of it alone is it necessary to take account. When last February Herr von Radovicz foresaw the policy of the Russian government in the east, when he let it be known that Germany did not deem it her duty to thwart Russia in that policy, he was told that Russia was only pursuing in the east a policy of moral conquest, and could not and would not find any material compensation if it foresaw circumstances which seemed to render such compensation necessary. It is Russia alone, therefore, which must be convinced of the necessity of finishing for a long time, if not forever, the periodical uneasiness which troubles the world.

All the powers have confined themselves with regard to the notes addressed to Belgium to timid and friendly representations. Not one has shown itself menacing, resolute, or even irritated. This was a test. To finish with France now, is not only an opportunity, but a duty toward Germany and toward humanity. Europe will never be tranquil as long as the struggle is possible, and the struggle is possible as long as the blunder of the last treaty is not retrieved, which leaves France ready to revive and to enter on a struggle. Germany is troubled by the knowledge of having only half crushed her enemy, and being able to defend herself only by sleeping with one eye open. What to-day promptly executed would cost only an insignificant sacrifice, two years hence would cost oceans of blood shed for the sake of gaining uncertain victories. Those who reason thus do not limit themselves to abstract considerations; they offer a positive conclusion. The war, they say, ought to be promptly undertaken and settled, to reduce France to a condition allowing Germany to indulge in a repose necessary to the definite development of its greatness. It is necessary to enter France, march on Paris, take up a position on the sheltered plateau of Avron, whence one could destroy the capital and sign a new peace, depriving France only of the territory of Belfort, limiting its active army, and fining it ten milliards in twenty yearly installments, with interest at 5 per cent, and without the option of paying it off sooner. Paris would only be attacked in the event of France refusing to sign such a treaty.

It would be untrue to say that the argument I have just repeated and the conclusion at which it arrives are accepted even in Germany outside the party which has adopted this programme. It would be equally untrue to say that these menaces are destined to be realized. The diplomatic world, even in Germany, affirm that they cannot fight against an enemy who does not want to fight, who announces that he will not fight, who has faithfully carried out the treaty he has signed, and declares himself without defense. All honest men in Germany scout these suppositions, and declare that the honor of Germany revolts against such a theory, and it is said that the Emperor himself, his eye directed toward history and his own conscience, has exclaimed, “After all, I am a gentleman, and I have signed a treaty.” But the partisans of immediate action reply that the supreme duty, paramount over all personal considerations, consists in serving and saving your country, and that it would be a woful mistake to sacrifice millions of men whose fate is confided to you to scruples as to the judgment of history even on the highest personages in the world. “It was not the German nation,” they urge, “which made the mistake, hut you. The nation followed you without hesitation. It gave you its gold, its children, its blood, without haggling. It was ready for anything; and when it stopped, it was at your bidding. It was not its fault if you made mistakes and left the enterprise unfinished; if you have signed deceptive treaties, it is for you to repair them, even at the price of your own pride. You led us to war in order to insure peace; that peace we have not gained, for you only half vanquished the enemy. If France will not fight, impose on it a re-assuring treaty without shedding blood. If you have no pretext, find one. If you do not find one, do without it. Your foreign contemporaries will censure you, no doubt; but Germany, strengthened, flourishing, and tranquil, will forever bless you.”

I am confident that this language is alarming to the calm and loyal minds in Germany itself. Public opinion there is opposed to such doctrines. To the easy victory thus held out to her, Germany prefers the hardest and most justifiable struggles the future may reserve for her, and in their present state courageous minds revolt against such counsels. I will go further. Here, in Paris, the entire diplomatic and political world may see in the German ambassador the type of an honorable adversary, who would never agree to play the role which might devolve upon him if these warlike doctrines were to be acted upon, and his presence is such a guarantee of loyalty, that whenever he is temporarily absent a kind of uneasiness pervades the political atmosphere of France.

All, however, that can be said cannot overcome the secret fears kindled in men’s minds by the doctrines of which I speak, and by the party which I have indicated, whose menacing theories are repeated in a whisper. People say to themselves that France, in spite of herself, assuredly cannot at this moment be dangerous or menacing; they say that public opinion in Germany would quickly change, as all national opinions do the moment there is a desire to change them; that if the Russian Emperor should show himself simply indifferent to the enterprises of Germany against France, the Emperor William would soon be persuaded out of his resistance, as a gentleman, by irresistible consideration of state, and by the aid of these arguments the mysterious fear of men’s minds is kept up. France is not, indeed, in a condition to show herself menacing or aggressive; but her constant fears, whether well founded or not, are not calculated to allow Europe the repose it needs while they frequently emanate from a source which is neither pure nor purely patriotic. Such, however, is the state of the case. It is Germany alone which can be aggressive. France assuredly wants peace, whether voluntarily or involuntarily matters little; she wants it, and without being entitled to any merit for it she must wish for it, and everybody knows the minister whom public opinion maintains in power in spite of the hatred of parties because he is known to be bent on peace. It is to Germany it belongs to re-assure the world by a clear declaration, which would not derogate from her pride or loyalty, and which would once for all impose silence on the chronic panics which disturb both France and the whole world. In order to have a right to reproach France with the constant uneasiness diffused over the world by its reviving terrors, Germany, in a fashion leaving not the slightest doubt, must disclaim the theories I have cited—theories which exist and have rallied many adherents, but against which it is necessary to re-assure, not France alone, for this might not be a cogent reason, but the civilized world; for these theories imperil all that yet remain intact of that moral force called “public right.” It is this consideration which should rouse Europe from its indifference, and remind it of that not very flattering but subtle recommendation of an old peasant woman, who, on leaving her children alone at the farm, said to them, “If anything happens to you do not cry ‘thieves.’ Nobody would come, for you alone would be robbed. Cry ‘fire’ if you want to rouse the neighbors, for the whole village might be burned.”

[Inclosure 3 in No. 113.]

THE FRENCH SCARE.

[From the London Times of May 6, 1875.]

We print this morning a letter from a French correspondent, which would certainly spread uneasiness throughout Europe if the apprehensions which it describes were well founded. We hasten to say that we believe these fears to be due only to the heated fancy of our French neighbors; but we give them publicity, because it would be worse than folly to hide any grave misgivings which maybe disturbing Paris. Some political observers of that capital look forward with alarm, it would seem, to the meeting between the German Emperor and the Emperor of Russia. The issues of peace or war, they think, depend upon the result of that interview, The military party of Germany believe, we are told, that she committed an immense blunder when she allowed France to escape so easily after the war. That fine of two hundred millions, which was thought at the time to be crushing, has proved to be only a light burden to a country so marvelously rich in the fertility of her soil and the industry and frugality of her people. France has lost Metz, but she retains Belfort. Nor has the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, or immense taxes, or political disunion, prevented her from making rapid strides toward her old state of military supremacy. She is arming for a war of revenge; but it is not too late for Germany to repair the grievous blunders which she made in a spirit of miscalculating mercy. A pretext being found for another war, she could again send her armies to the gates of Paris. Then France would be commanded to surrender Belfort, to limit her active army, to pay ten milliards of francs in twenty yearly installments, which she should have no power to anticipate, and until the day of clearance to contribute 5 per cent, interest on the unredeemed balance of the debt. If the Emperor of Russia should sanction such a scheme, say the informants of our French correspondent, Germany would fear no other potentate, and France would be crushed.

We could not do a better service to the cause of international peace than by thus stating, in all the crudity of their extravagance, the fears of these Parisian politicians. Such apprehensions ought to be brought into the daylight with all possible speed. We can also best show that they are groundless by frankly confessing that the relations of France and Germany are not satisfactory. The French people would have been a race of seraphs if they had borne with resignation the tremendous disasters of the war, or if they had accepted the conditions of peace with meek thankfulness. The fact is, their vanity prompted them to believe that they had been overthrown merely because they had been taken unprepared, because the empire was only a gilded fiction, and because luck had for once gone against them. Nor could they have been expected to surrender Alsace and Lorraine without mentally registering a vow to wrench both provinces from the grasp of the victor. Nor, again, could they have paid five milliards of francs without determining that they would some day exact a stern repayment at Berlin. But there is nothing unusual or which ought to be felt as alarming in their cherishing such hopes or expressing such threats. A consummate man of the world like Prince Bismarck would be the last to grudge that dream of retribution which is the solace of the vanquished. We admit, however, that there are more tangible facts than angry or boastful anticipations. France is climbing to her old state of prosperity with a speed which may well excite the envy of her conqueror. Perhaps, indeed, she has been less changed by the war than Germany.

Since money is power in these days, we cannot expect the military party in Prussia to look with indifference to the immense wealth which the pressure of events has revealed in their rival. But the most formidable of all the facts is, that France is rapidly restoring her military strength, and we frankly admit that she is doing this with imprudent haste. She has vast resources, but in the present condition of her finances it would be far better for her to spend any surplus revenue in the redemption of debt, or to diminish her taxes, than to embarrass herself by an immense war budget. Even if her military expenditure were reduced by at least one-third, her army would be large enough to provide for her internal security and to guard her frontiers. All this may be frankly admitted; but, human nature being what it is, we can scarcely be surprised that the French should yearn to regain the military power which was their chief glory. They may do so without having any definite scheme of revenge, and, indeed, there is not the slightest reason to believe that the most warlike of their statesmen cherishes more than a vague dream of some day dictating conditions of peace. The very wildest Parisian visionaries know that, for the present at least, war is out of the question, and the tone of the National Assembly is as peaceful as the temper of the House of Commons. It is quite true that warlike possibilities may exist in the future, and we can state them without reserve. If the French army were thoroughly organized, if some political party believed its last hope to lie in a victorious compaign on the Rhine, if Germany were to lose so much of her discretion as to choose such a moment for an attack on another neighbor, and if allies were thus thrown to the side of France, then, no doubt, the prospects of Europe would be dark indeed. But such a list of contingencies recalls the predictions that England may yet have to encounter some great state at the very time when she has on her hands a disordered Ireland and mutinous colonies. It is the business of statesmanship to prevent the accumulation of critical dangers.

So much may be said on the side of France. It is easy, on the other hand, to under-stand the reasoning of those Germans who look at political relations solely from a military point of view. They naturally think that the best way to protect Germany is to crush France. But if they believe that they were too merciful during the late war, and that they ought to repair their neglect by picking a quarrel, in the hope of annihilating the power of France, their reasoning is as mistaken in the one case as it is detestable in the other. More rigorous conditions of peace might not have been safe, even to the victor. France was sufficiently crushed to accept the proposed terms with a sullen acquiescence; but M. Gambetta was at the head of a war party, which might have proved too strong for the restraints of prudence if the victors had made a more wanton use of their power, and a renewal of the war at the dictate of desperation might have been embarrassing to Germany as well as to France. That consideration, however, belongs to history. Far different would be the proposal to begin the war anew, without provocation, and solely to complete an unfinished work of destruction. But we utterly disbelieve the statement that so cynical an idea has taken hold of any considerable or powerful part of the German people. Whatever maybe loosely said at military mess-tables, or whispered in a spirit of bravado, it is impossible that such a statesman as Prince Bismarck could gravely suggest, or such a ruler as the Emperor sanction, or such a nation as the Germans support, a proposal to destroy a neighboring state simply because, in some unforeseen circumstances, it might again become aggressive. That plea would be more worthy of a barbarian conqueror than of a civilized state. Were it even to be seriously discussed by responsible statesmen, a deadly blow would be struck at the feeling of trust which is as necessary to the intercourse of nations as of men. The German people do not need to be informed that they would commit a flagrant breach of international morality if they were to break a treaty of peace which was recently imposed upon France and signed by their own representatives; nor do they need to be warned against so cynical an outrage as an attack on a nation which desires to remain at peace with them. It is said that the military party are trying to make the Emperor lay aside his personal feelings of honor out of regard for the interests of the nation; but we refuse to believe that he has been insulted, even by the suggestion, to blacken his own conscience at the dictate of a Machiavelian patriotism. He has given no one a right to think that he would thus play fast and loose with those moral obligations which are as binding on the rulers of great nations as on the humblest of their subjects. Nor is there any more reason to suppose that the Emperor of Russia would lend his influence to a wanton attack on a state with which he has not the slightest cause of quarrel. It is probable that, if the origin of the rumors we publish only to discredit were probed deeply enough, it would be found in the careless blustering of Prussian soldiers, in the strange recklessness of the Berlin press, and perhaps in some empty menaces let fall by statesmen who place great reliance on the diplomatic value of fear. But these explanations would be insufficient to account for any alarm in France if revolutions, wars, rumors of wars, and a chronic state of suspense, had not taken, even from intellectual Frenchmen, the faculty of political judgment. Living in an atmosphere of suspicion, they mistake the phantoms of their own imagination for realities. Otherwise, political men could not for a moment he misled by the wild idea that the German Emperor, the Emperor of Russia, Prince Bismarck, and the German people, would all combine to annihilate the power of France in order to prevent her from sending her armies across the Rhine in some distant and hypothetical future.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 113.]

FRENCH SCARE.

Paris, Friday, May 7—9.30 p.m.

[From the London Times of May 8, 1875.]

The letter and leading article you published yesterday are the chief topic of discussion in political circles and in the press. The official evening paper, the Bulletin Français, says:

“The Times published yesterday a communication addressed to it from Paris, the author of which seemed to admit the eventuality of foreign complications. The organ of the city was careful, it is true, to present this letter as a specimen of extravagant fear. This precaution was excellent, for, as the Agence Havas states in denying bourse rumors which have been circulated with regard to our foreign relations, no news has arrived and no incident has arisen which could justify such rumors and such alarms.”

The Moniteur, alluding to the letter, says:

“There may be some exaggeration in this way of looking at things, but we ourselves remarked two days ago that the situation was wanting in clearness, and that it was very desirable it should be speedily cleared up., People continue, and with reason, to rely much on the assistance of the Emperor of Russia to put aside the dangers of war, and the hopes which are expressed on this point are wide-spread in Germany. For our own part, we believe they will be realized. It is impossible that Germany should discover in the fear of an imaginary revenge in the future the pretext for a war of aggression at the present time. Certain German publicists shamelessly agitate these terrible questions, but we do not think the Berlin cabinet encourages such controversies or adopts their conclusions.”

The Français, the Due de Broglie’s organ, says:

“We can only advise the public to preserve, if possible, an imperturbable composure, and to display rigorous circumspection in the circumstances in which France now finds herself. These are necessary qualities, and it is urgently requisite that all Frenchmen should acquire them if they do not already possess them. We can affirm, moreover, that the most recent news in the diplomatic world tends rather to reassure public opinion. It shows that there is in Europe a settled desire to preserve peace. At St. Petersburg, and London especially, this disposition is exhibited.”

The Journal de Paris says:

“It may be that Prussia dreams of a fresh war. It is indisputable in any case that she is urged to it by certain of her statesmen and military leaders. Nevertheless, before taking a resolution of this weight she is obliged to consult Russia. She is obliged to do so for two reasons: first, because the Russian alliance preserves her from all fear on the part of Austria; and next, because the understanding agreed upon at Berlin in 1872 would be destroyed the day when one of the three powers undertakes a war without the consent of the other two. Russia, however, has no longer the same interest to-day as in 1870 in a victory by Prussia and a defeat by France.”

The France, after quoting the Times’ leading article, says:

“Nothing could have been better expressed, and this article gives us the exact keynote of public opinion in England. The alarmists will not disarm themselves on this account, and the interview of Monday next will perhaps furnish them with afresh pretext.”

The Presse says:

“Let us draw attention to the fact that almost at the same moment The Times published its alarmist correspondence, a Vienna paper—the Neue Freie Presse—gave a telegram from Berlin according to which M. de Bismarck intended to convince the Czar of the pacific intentions of Germany, but also to warn him that the military measures taken in France seemed to show that the French government was not animated with the same sentiments. The intelligence of The Times and of the Neue Freie Presse contradicts one another. We would only accept so much of it as refers to the peaceful disposition which The Times’ correspondent rightly attributes to France and the Berlin telegram to Germany.”

The Mémorial Diplomatique says:

“France, far from seeking for war, remains faithful to its policy of peace and scrupuously respects the treaties concluded with Germany. As to the three northern courts, it would be libeling them to believe that they wish without any reason whatever to attack France and to trample upon, themselves, the system of political status quo and general peace which constitutes the bases of their agreement.”

[Inclosure 5 in No. 113.]

THE FRENCH SCARE.

[From the London Times of May 8, 1875.]

Nothing can show more painfully the untoward condition of the continent than the disquiet of which a French correspondent gave intimation in our columns two days ago. The existence of the uneasiness he noticed is admitted, with more or less reserve of phrase, by the French journals which comment on his letter; but when we consider the origin of these apprehensions they appear to be rather an induction from a variety of circumstances, most of them inevitable, than to arise from anything which is even remotely the act of the German government. We are reassured when we consider that it would be wonderful if such rumors failed to come into existence. If we accept the conditions of Germany and France, the mutual suspicion of preparing for another war might be predicted with certainty. This is the legacy which the late fatal struggle has left to the two countries, and, so far as human judgment can discern, it must oppress them both for many a year.

It is intimated that in Paris men connected with political life, and having the means of forming a probable opinion, believe that a party exists in Germany which meditates an attack on France, and that this party may possibly acquire strength enough to control the policy of the imperial government. This is not the gossip of the boulevards, but the whisper of political salons; it has hardly passed as yet into the discussions of the press, but it is repeated with caution among those who have relations with Germany, and receive confidential communications from their friends beyond the Rhine. It would be useless to pretend that these people have absolutely no grounds for their apprehensions. Such a feeling as is described could never be generated without some cause; and, moreover, the cause in the present case may be discerned without much difficulty by those who have paid attention to continental polities since the war. The French tell each other that the existence and designs of a war party in Germany are beyond a doubt. They say that it comprises generals and politicians, and loses no opportunity of pressing its advice. Its followers are numerous in the army, and a considerable body in the public; its influence is largely felt in the press. It is animated by bitter hostility to France; it dreads her restoration; it regrets that she was not more completely disabled by the last war; and its constant counsel is that the work must be taken in hand again and clone more effectually. In this picture of a powerful party plotting the ruin of France we recognize partly an image conjured up by an excited imagination, and partly the distorted reflection of real incidents. We have received from Germany itself descriptions which are the very counterpart of the rumors current in France. Indeed, one need go no further than the German papers to find the origin of these alarms. As France has recovered strength, the Germans have naturally watched her progress. Since the revival has been more rapid than was anticipated, uneasiness has more rapidly increased, and, as the Germans are not disposed to reticence, the new attitude of their enemy has occasionally become the topic of angry and defiant comments. Designs very like those which, our French correspondent speaks of may have been found covertly referred to in more than one German newspaper. Every phase of the reconstruction of the French army has been noticed, discussed technically in one article, popularly in another, but in each with an obvious impression that imminent danger menaced Germany, and that sooner or later this force on which rich and elastic France was spending milliards would be turned against the empire. Every now and then the irritability with regard to the alleged preparations of France shows itself, as some new step in the re-organization of the French army is reported. This is no new theory. For the last three years, and long before the army of occupation was withdrawn, Germans might be heard saying that the last war had ended too soon, that France was let off too easily, and that another and a more thorough campaign would be necessary to complete the work. Talk-of this kind was naturally first heard from those voluble spirits who dominate at a convivial meeting, but are not generally supposed to have much influence in the counsels of statesmen. But, as the nation has been excited by the struggle with ultramontanism, which it persists in attributing to French instigation, and as France resumes its place as a formidable military state, the number of people in Germany who would think, and consequently speak and write, in this fashion naturally increases. It is easy to understand that in military circles, or wherever a roomful of patriotic citizens are engaged on a discussion of foreign affairs, there should be some one to say, “We must not wait to be attacked: if we find that France is preparing to strike, we must anticipate the blow, and take care that the danger shall not recur.” In conversations with Frenchmen such a feeling would take the form of a boastful warning, and there is, therefore, nothing extraordinary in the belief which obtains in Paris that the country is openly menaced by the Germans.

This we believe to be the true explanation of the misgivings to which our correspondent has called attention. With regard to them our readers will form their own opinion. It would be presumption to say that they are wholly without importance. The existence of a conviction in a section of German society that-war is inevitable, and that it would be well to anticipate the enemy, must necessarily be a fact of some importance. And if even, as we incline to think, the expressions which disquiet France are uttered rather in bravado and irritation, and do not manifest any fixed purpose, they are still not without significance, since such things become serious by repetition, and many an act of popular infatuation has had its origin in a cry which few quite believed in. But from such a vague sentiment of hostility on the part of a section of the Germans to a settled plot of the German government there is a vast distance. We need not repeat the reasons which make it, in our judgment, morally impossible that the Emperor and his ministers should conceive the design of breaking the treaty they themselves imposed, and attacking France without reason, on a frivolous pretext, or on none at all. They would sacrifice their own good name and the honor of their country, and they would place the empire in a relation of intolerable suspicion to its neighbors. From whatever point of view we contemplate the alleged design, we recognize its futility. The very motives are insufficient. Belfort is alleged to be a thorn in the side of Germany; but it is certain that four years ago the highest military authorities of Germany were of opinion that Belfort would be a burden to them, while, if left to France, it would be of little service to her. Its position, out of the necessary track of war, explains this. Furthermore, the design of permanently crippling the resources of France by heavy indemnities, by occupation prolonged for years, and by a permanent restriction of the numbers of the French army, is one which no statesman or economist can really think feasible. The German government would only create for itself embarrassments compared with which the present are trifling. Military weakness with regard to other powers would attend the long diversion of its forces, first in subjugating, and then in keeping down a desperate enemy; the burden on the population of Germany would be immensely increased, and, after all, unless the French people were crushed out of existence, a time must come when they must be left to meditate and prepare for a war of vengeance, as they are said to be doing now. Besides this, who can imagine that statesmen of the caliber of Prince Bismarck and his colleagues do not reflect on the animosity which would be excited in Europe by an outrage unparalleled since the days of the first French empire? Considering the temper of a large part, we believe the majority, of the Russian people, and the suspicions and jealousies of other continental states, it is hardly possible that the German empire should commit itself to the tremendous enterprise of ruining France without finding its neighbors gravitate to each other in a hostile league. These considerations seem sufficient to dispel the belief that the German government contemplates any renewal of the war. In fact, as we pass from the circumstances which the French have noticed to the conclusions which they have drawn from them, we feel that the transition is from the real and tangible to the utterly misty and fanciful. What the French have to consider is the feeling which has been caused in Germany by their reconstruction of the army. This feeling, whether its extent be great or little, is a fact, and the French must make up their minds to take it as an element in their calculations. They have a perfect right to raise a great and well-appointed army, but, during the present relations of the two countries, it is certain that the apprehensions of a part of the German people will find vent in a good deal more of the vague defiance which the French misinterpret as the utterance of the German government.